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HD HYL
***Echoes of
the Korean
War***



Front Cover:

**Watchword “Here is 38 parallel. Let’s dash north”,
set up by US imperialists and south Korean puppets**

Echoes of the Korean War

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Editorial Board's Note

It is nearly half a century since the outbreak of the Korean war. However, quite a few people still argue the controversial questions why and by whom the war was started, though the cold war was ended.

In 1993 this editorial board published translations into different languages of a book published in English in the United States, *The Korean War, an Unanswered Question*, by Dr. Chang Young Rim (1909-1996), Emeritus Professor of Social Politics of New York State University and former south Korean ambassador to the United Nations (1960-61).

In 1995 a voluminous Russian book, *Korea-Division, War and Unification*, was put out in Russia.

Parts Three and Four of the book, composed of five parts, are a search for the "golden mean," since in the historiography of the Korean question various conflicting versions and conceptions are quaintly entangled.

We are publishing these parts in book form, not because we consider that the "golden mean" was found. This is a matter to be evaluated by the reader.

The Korean question is an international question caused by the confrontation of the interests of

big powers and is the most acute international political problem of the current century, which cannot be settled by new schemes of the big powers. All the people in north and south Korea would not allow it. The masters of the solution of the Korean question are the Korean people themselves. Everyone will sympathize completely with such a view on the part of the authors of the book, because it is no exaggeration to say that such a tone of argument is acknowledged on a worldwide scale at the present time when the cold war is ended.

We hope only that the states responsible for the division of Korea and the Korean war will meet the demands of the time and do deeds beneficial to the reunification of Korea.

As parts of the book were chosen to be put out in book form, the contents of the book were rearranged with sections newly numbered; the preface and conclusion are given in full. Errors in some concepts, figures, names of places and dates were corrected. Repetition and digressions from the main point were omitted or shortened on account of space. Difficult sentences were paraphrased, leaving the authors' idea intact.

Pyongyang, 1996

From the Authors

Half a century has passed from the end of World War II to 1995, but mankind failed to settle many sociopolitical problems caused by this war. One of them is the division into two of the living organism of the Korean people. Half a century of division of Korea is a chronic illness of modern society. It was predetermined by the actions of the heads of the Allied Powers—the United States, the USSR and Britain—in 1945. At the Cairo Conferences (November and December 1943), Teheran Conference (November 1943), Yalta Conference (February 1945) and Potsdam Conference (July 1945) they discussed the postwar arrangement of the world. The “Korean question” was discussed without consultation with the representatives of Korea, without consent of the Korean people.

The Korean question as such went through several stages.

The first stage—1905-1945. The genesis of the Korean question and adoption of resolutions on the postwar arrangement of the world by the Allied Powers, victors in World War II.

The second stage—1945-1949. Collapse in Korea of the Japanese colonial system and aggravation of the division of the country under conditions of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The third stage—1949-1950. Maturing of armed conflict.

The fourth stage—1950-1953. The three-year war, which took a toll of several million lives.

The fifth stage—1954-1995. Maintenance of division on the Korean peninsula. Endeavours of the Korean people for peaceful reunification.

In these decades the Korean question was considered in different capitals of the world differently.

The leaders of the Soviet Union, a responsible party in the division of Korea, wanted Korea to be an outpost of socialism in the Asia-Pacific region. From the height of Capitol Hill in Washington the American government gazed at Korea as another “estate of liberty and democracy” in the modern world.

The Soviet Union and the United States pursued policies towards postwar Korea in conformity with their political doctrines.

It cannot be said that the Korean question was insufficiently studied by historians for half a century. In the United States alone, for example, more than 3,000 works were devoted to this problem.

Towards the mid-'90s in Russia two contradictory approaches to an appraisal of events in Korea were formed.

In one camp remain those who are under the strong influence of the former official versions and stereotypes of Soviet propaganda. In the other group are those who entirely refute the propositions of Soviet war historiography.

If the “orthodox” painted a picture of historical

events exclusively in white, the “democrats” resorted in the main to black.

As a result, people in many countries in the world, not to mention the Russian Federation, are disoriented about the history of Korea and the present state of the Korean question.

Taking the situation into account, the authors strove to find the “golden mean”. They backed away from the extremely fantastic appraisal of the past, but were not carried away by a radical “reappraisal of value”.

The authors strove to elucidate the problem objectively, but it was not so simple, for in the historiography of the Korean question contradictory versions and conceptions were strangely entangled.

As a result of the evolution of Soviet policy and historiography Russians and citizens of the other former republics of the USSR have no clear, objective understanding of the essence, character, main stages of development and possible ways of solving the Korean problem.

A sociological inquiry carried out in 1994 among Russian citizens of Korean nationality showed that they were interested in the following questions:

–By whom, when and with what aim was Korea divided into two?

–Under what conditions did the war on the Korean peninsula mature? Who was responsible for the increase of tension in this period?

–Who in June 1950 started the war on the Korean peninsula?

–What was the UN Forces in Korea?

–What are the sociopolitical consequences of the Korean war?

–To what extent and in what concrete form was the Soviet Union involved in the Korean war?

–To what scale was the People's Republic of China concretely involved in the Korean war?

–Who were the Chinese Volunteers? What was their international mission in Korea?

–How has the Korean question been solved after 1953?

In this book the reader will find the answers to these problems.

The book comprises five parts. Each part is devoted to a separate period of the Korean question.

Part One, "Liberation and Division of the Country," gives a short historical account of the rise of the state on the Korean peninsula, the main stages of development of the Korean ethnos and the present settlement of Koreans in different regions.

The reader will be acquainted with concrete facts and events of the history of the beginning and development of the struggle of the Korean patriots against the Japanese colonial yoke.

Documents of the Yalta Conference, Potsdam Conference and Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers (December 1945) as to the mechanism and aim of division of Korea disclose the main differences in the approach of the Soviet Union and the United States towards the question of the post-war arrangement of Korea.

Part Two, "Deepening of National Division," discloses the essence of the principled positions of

Moscow and Pyongyang on the question of reunification of Korea on the basis of study of documents in different archives.

Diverse materials from American and south Korean sources made it possible to disclose the real purpose of the concept of the United States about "trusteeship" over Korea.

Part Three, "Running to War," gives a detailed account of how and for what war machines were created in south Korea and what military-technical assistance the United States gave to the south Koreans (many different documents, testimonies of witnesses and statistical data are quoted).

Published for the first time are documents laying bare the contents of the south Korean plan for a "northward march" and the direct participation of American specialists in its working out. A separate chapter is devoted to the history of the founding of the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the process of strengthening the defence of the country.

Part Four, "Three-Year-Long War," gives a concrete description of the course and outcome of military actions on the Korean peninsula in 1950-1953.

The authors paid special attention to analysis of the factors that conditioned the beginning of large-scale military operations in June 1950.

The two powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—did not succeed in solving the Korean question at the negotiating table in the period from 1946 to 1949 and a voice was given to the sword. The Korean war is rightly called the "first big local war of the second half of the 20th century."

There is a grain of truth in appraising it as a "small third world war."

Many countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Britain, were involved in this international armed conflict one way or another at different times, were they not? There were Asian, European, African and even Latin American countries.

Although the armed struggle in 1950-1953 was fought in a rather limited space (within the bounds of the Korean peninsula), the war was felt 1,000 miles from Pyongyang and Seoul. Ashes of the war spread all over the world. Millions of people crippled in this war or injured morally and psychologically are still alive.

In Part Five, "Korea on the Way to Reunification," the authors considered it necessary to elucidate the history of the Korean question in the period from the end of military action in July 1953 on the Korean peninsula to the present time. At the same time alternatives of the solution of the Korean question were considered.

Solution of the Korean question is a bilateral process. However engaging a project one of the parties may advance, it is impossible to realize it without the consent and active participation of the other party concerned. Perhaps no sane politician would refuse to admit this truth. Already one general admission of it has objectively opened the way for dialogue and a search for the way to a peaceful solution of the problem.

A second condition is mutual admission of the undesirability and impossibility of a solution to the

Korean question by means of armed force or another war on the Korean peninsula.

Still another indispensable condition for solution of the Korean question is that the Korean people themselves should become masters for it.

A paradox of modern history—the division of Korea without consulting the people of this country—cannot be liquidated by a “third force”, that is, new backstage intrigues of the big powers.

Today the voice of the Korean people is sounding all over the world.

The book was written on the basis of study of documents in Russian and Korean archives, critical analysis of military-political and military-historical literature published after 1945 in the USSR, Russian Federation, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, south Korea, Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China and other countries.

Very important and interesting information was obtained by the authors as a result of talks with a large number of witnesses of history—citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, south Korea and the United States.

This book was written by war historians, political scientists, noted political and military figures of the Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States; Doctor of History, Professor, honorary member of Military History Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Russia G.I. Korotkov; Candidate of History Yu. V. Wanin; Candidate of Philosophy N. I. Shapowalov; Candidate of History Ye. I. Jyujin; Candidate of History I. M. Popov; Candidate of History G.V. Yeponesh-

nikowa; Professor A.V. Shek; General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union N. G. Lyashchenko; veteran of the Korean war Pak Yong Bin (Lieutenant General); N.N. Jang (Major General); V. I. Hwang. General editorship was undertaken by Admiral V. M. Grishanov and winner of the state prize of the USSR P. X. Kang.

Moscow, 1995

CONTENTS

Editorial Board's Note	1
From the Authors.....	3
Section One South Korea Is Turned into a Military Bridgehead	2
Seoul Allies of the United States.....	2
The Far Eastern Forward Outpost of the United States.....	11
Founding of the "National Defence Force".....	15
"Northward March" Plan.....	22
Liberation Struggle in South Korea.....	29
Section Two The Northern Half of the Republic Obtains a Regular Army.....	35
Strengthening and Development of the Korean People's Army as a Regular Army	35
The Army Grows in Strength and Experience.....	39
Section Three Spring Is Compressed Inexorably ...	48
War Plan Is Reexamined in Seoul	48
Strategic Disinformation and Reconnaissance	52
Balance of Confrontation Forces	64
Section Four Thundery June.....	70
The First Shot	70
The First Days of War	89
The UN's Stance	93
Conclusion	103

It is well known that wars do not break out of their own accord. They mature gradually or rather rapidly.

War, in essence, is the continuation of the policy of the state (of the ruling party) by military means. It is possible to understand the origin, essence and sociopolitical character of the Korean war only by studying the policies of the two confrontation parties on the eve of the war.

The Korean war was unique in its sociopolitical character and military strategy. Therefore, its deep origin and genuine causes cannot be limited to conflicts of a local character (geographical bounds of the Korean peninsula) and current factors (of the period from 1948 to 1950).

The march to war, as already mentioned, began in the autumn of 1945 when the two victorious powers in World War II—the USSR and the United States—divided Korea into two parts in accordance with their interests, causing a social confrontation between north and south.

These two powers failed to achieve agreement on the question of reunification of Korea by means of negotiation and north-south confrontation was aggravated. That in itself predetermined the march to war.

Section One

South Korea Is Turned into a Military Bridgehead

Seoul Allies of the United States

The United States seemed to be omnipotent after the victory of the Allied Powers in the world war against aggressor states. Such, at any rate, seemed to be the world as seen through the prism of the White House. In this connection many scientific treatises and analytical articles were written. Harry Truman did not hesitate when he acquainted himself with the analytical report of specialists in the spring of 1948.

There were three alternatives, Truman recalled: "1) to give up Korea (let the communists swallow it up entirely); 2) to take political and military responsibility for Korea (as it had already done in relation to West Germany); 3) to render assistance to the south Korean government in creating and equipping its army. The National Security Council, consisting of the most experienced political and military figures of the United States, proposed choosing the last alternative, and I accepted their proposal."

Thus, the Number-One American confirmed that the United States had purposefully prepared Korea for the evident mission of a satellite.

The formation of a “government” in Seoul showed in its practical activity that it had no independence and served only as an obedient instrument in the hands of the American occupiers.

The American military clique in its turn did not even try to hide it that after the May 10 “election” it intended to command and boss all affairs in south Korea as before.

On June 1, 1948, Lieutenant General Hodge sent an official letter to the “National Assembly” of south Korea in which he suggested how it should behave, what resolutions it should adopt and so forth. The letter contained this direction: “The National Assembly should not be hasty in adopting a Constitution on the basis of which the form of the Korean government cannot be pleasing to the United Nations.”

The draft “Constitution” was worked out beforehand by the US Military Government Office. It envisaged maintenance of the regime established in south Korea by the US occupiers. The draft “Constitution” was submitted for consideration to the “National Assembly”, which passed it without amendment and supplement after a short debate. Thus the south Korean “Constitution” was born.

What was it like?

The “Constitution” provided that the laws proclaimed by the US command from the beginning of occupation to the founding of the “National Assembly” continue to be in force in south Korea. In August 1948 it was officially confirmed by the special agreement signed by Syngman Rhee and the representative of the United States.

According to the "Constitution", all mines and underground resources were "nationalized". This article was included so as to facilitate the American colonizers to seize the natural resources of south Korea.

The "Constitution" invested the President with unlimited rights. He had the right: to establish relations with foreign states; to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, members of the Cabinet, chairman of the supreme court and all high-ranking officials; to issue orders having the power of law; to approve international treaties; to declare war and conclude a peace; to manage and command all the armed forces. The "President" did not have to obey the "National Assembly" and could act at his own discretion in all cases.

The Americans, fearing that the "National Assembly" might disobey their high-handed directions for separate problems, decided to put full power into the hands of one person—their reliable ally—and implement their imperialist policy in south Korea through him. The Americans recommended to the post of President their old "friend" Syngman Rhee.

Even deputies to the "National Assembly" had to admit the antinational character of the "Constitution". So Sun Yong, for example, said in one of his speeches, "Legislative power according to the Constitution belongs actually to the President, and the National Assembly is assigned the role of a puppet." In his speech deputy Ri Tu Yong said, "The Constitution puts all power into the hands of the President, not those of the people."

Adopting the "Constitution" and electing Syngman Rhee "President" on July 6, 1948, the "National Assembly" set about forming a "government". The "National Assembly" was divided into many groups, each striving to nominate its protege to a ministerial post. At last, on August 3, the "government" was formed. Ri Pom Sok was approved as "prime minister". This 50-year-old politician had lived abroad in exile for more than 20 years and had distinguished himself in south Korea by founding a terrorist organization on the pattern of the fascist Hitlerite youth league. Ri Pom Sok openly preached fascism and called for the physical extermination of Korean patriots. A member of Syngman Rhee's party, Yun Chi Yong, police protege Jang Thae Sang and others were appointed ministers.

The basic course of domestic and foreign policies was proclaimed. "President" Syngman Rhee declared that the south Korean government would establish, with the assistance of the United States, a big army for the struggle against the communist north, for a march into Manchuria and war against the Soviet Union. Commenting on this declaration, the newspaper *Seoul Times* wrote: "Thus in his speech Dr. Syngman Rhee confirmed the correctness of the circulating rumour that the main objective of the government to be set up in the American occupation zone will be to fight against the Soviet Union."

At the same time Syngman Rhee admitted that his "government" could not carry out its policy without the daily and broad assistance of its American

ally. "We wish," Syngman Rhee declared, "US troops to remain in Korea."

The south Korean "government" considered it the main task of its domestic policy to fight against the democratic national liberation movement.

The official ceremony for the beginning of activity of the "government" was held on August 15, 1948.

On August 13 General Hodge had declared a state of emergency for three days. All the American and Korean troops, police and terrorists went on combat alert.

A mass roundup of the opponents of establishing a separate "government" in south Korea was carried out. On August 15 on the day of proclamation of the new "government" more than 100 persons were arrested in Inchon and more than 200 persons were arrested in the region of Taegu (North Kyongsang Province).

On the morning of August 15 General MacArthur entered Seoul, accompanied by many military retinue and cameramen.

Both sides of the road of his procession were lined by US soldiers and officers. Koreans were not seen.

The ceremony of proclamation of the beginning of activity of the Seoul "government" was attended by the group of US diplomats, General MacArthur with his wife, General Hodge with his officers, US "specialists" in south Korea, members of the UN Commission on Korea, and dozens of American cameramen.

After the ceremony American generals reviewed

the armed forces in Seoul. Troops marched along the streets. US planes circled in the sky. This military demonstration aimed at intimidating the population. However, neither MacArthur's arrival nor the demonstration of the armed forces had the expected impact on the freedom-loving Korean people. Their struggle against the US occupiers and their puppet only was intensified.

In mid-August 1948 John C. Muccio, special envoy of Truman, arrived in Seoul in the capacity of the United States' ambassador in south Korea. Instead of a US Military Government Office, a US military mission, headed by Brigadier General W. Roberts, was formed in Seoul. All south Korean "government", military, economic and other establishments and organizations were placed under the control of US advisors. According to the correspondent for *The New York Times* in Seoul, at the beginning of 1950 there were 500 US advisors in south Korea. Command of the US troops in south Korea was entrusted to Major General Coulter.

Ambassador Muccio, head of the US military mission Roberts and commander of the US troops Coulter constituted a "triumvirate" to which full power actually went in south Korea after elections were held there.

The Seoul "government" was given the right of wide initiative and independence only in the realm of struggle against communism, that is, in the suppression and physical extermination of Korean patriots fighting for the reunification, independence and democratic development of their country.

On August 24, 1948, Syngman Rhee put his

signature to the secret south Korea-US “transitional provisional administration agreement on military affairs and safety.” From the speeches of several deputies to the “National Assembly” and reports in the south Korean press it is known that this agreement did not stipulate any term of withdrawal of US troops from south Korea, established full control of the US advisors over south Korean troops, police and vitally important regions and facilities, granted the US military clique the right to engage in the organization, preparation and equipping of south Korean troops and the right of operational control and “legalized” the long-term presence of the US troops.

The *Seoul Times* wrote that this agreement secured the supreme control of Americans over all Korean armed forces of south Korea, including police, security forces and coast guards. It went on, “The US armed forces will continue to render assistance to the Korean security forces and coast guards in training and equipping them in the period envisaged in the agreement, which admits that the US armed forces in Korea will use regions and facilities necessary for their maintenance as before.”

On September 11, 1948, the south Korean “government” concluded with the US government the so-called “financial and property transfer agreement,” fettering south Korea.

The south Korean “government” agreed to lay on the shoulders of the population all expenses for the maintenance of the US occupation army, including expenses for repair and maintenance of

buildings, barracks, warehouses, garages and other areas occupied by large numbers of US troops. Syngman Rhee's "government" took upon itself all the former expenses borne by south Korea for maintenance of the US army from September 9, 1945, to June 30, 1948, and committed itself to make no claim to the United States in future. According to this agreement, the Americans received the unlimited right to obtain and dispose of movable and immovable property in south Korea.

When this agreement was debated in the "National Assembly", 28 deputies left the conference hall as a sign of protest and made the following statement on September 21, 1948: "We have never seen such an unequal agreement. The overwhelming majority of the people do not support it." Therefore, the statement continued, "We demand to amend the agreement as follows:

"1. To hand over all military property, war industry, all finances and also police and security forces to the south Korean government and subordinate them to it.

"2. The American government should take upon itself all expenses related to the stationing of the US army in the country which average 20 million dollars a month, because the south Korean government is incapable of covering such expenses.

"3. Expenses related to repair and maintenance of buildings for the US army are to be borne by the US government.

"4. All former Japanese property, including that

sold, must be handed over to the south Korean government.

“5. To delete from the agreement the clause concerning creating a special US organ for control of the extraction and use of rare metals in south Korea.

“6. To delete from the agreement the clause about the payment of 25 million dollars to the United States by south Korea.

“7. To delete from the agreement the clause obligating south Korea not to export from the country goods received from America or to get agreement with the US government on such export.”

The last point of the declaration said: “It is not permissible that the agreement allows Americans to have complete control of our country, because such a situation could cause the mass discontent of the people.”

On December 10, 1948, a new act of betrayal of the Korean people was committed in Seoul. Syngman Rhee’s “government” concluded with the United States an “agreement on economic aid” to south Korea in accordance with the Marshall Plan. This agreement completed the establishment of complete economic and political control of the United States over south Korea. Syngman Rhee’s “government” was obligated to handle foreign trade, plan industrial production and the economy and use American assistance only by agreement with the US representatives. It was specified that Syngman Rhee’s “government” would encourage the investment of American private capital in south Korea, facilitate the activity of American traders

and promote the transfer to the United States of various materials produced or extracted in south Korea.

The Far Eastern Forward Outpost of the United States

Immediately after the end of World War II the United States adopted a vast programme of buildup of military might in accordance with the notorious military-political doctrine of “containment of communism.” It was specifically affirmed by the steady increase in US military expenses:

BUDGET FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURE
(Unit: One Million Dollars)

Fiscal year military budget Budgetary items	1947-1948 (Settlement)	1948-1949 (Budget)	1949-1950 (Budget)
National defence	10,914	14,700	15,900
Atomic energy	466	632	725
Aviation	136	194	256
Marine transport	183	152	182
Total	11,699	15,678	17,063

At the same time the Americans continued to perfect their “forward line”—a global chain of military bases and bridgeheads—around socialist countries.

South Korea was considered in Washington as the most important link of this chain. It is understandable that the Korean peninsula attracted the US not only for its rich reserve of military-strategic raw materials, but also for its geographical location. It was like a bridge between the US and Japan, on the one hand, and the US and the Soviet Union and China, on the other hand. The distance between Japanese islands (Honshu and Kyushu) and Korea in the narrowest places of the Korean and Tsushima straits does not exceed 180 kilometres. In these straits is the fairly large island of Tsushima. This, in the opinion of American strategists, allowed the US to rapidly transfer a large mass of troops from Japan to Korea and then to the Asian continent. It is known that the Japanese imperialists used Korea precisely as a special springboard to attack China.

Having occupied Japan in September 1945, the US troops set to building many naval and air-force bases on Japanese islands.

The Truman administration undertook practical steps with a view to the revival of the Japanese armed forces. "We," Senator Estland said, "must allow Germany to rearm under our control. We must also permit creation of an anti-communist army in Japan under our control." (*Pravda*, April 29, 1950.)

Washington naturally tried to entrench itself in Korea. As the *Journal American* mentioned, US policy in south Korea was under the direct control of the State Department and was carried out on a large scale, headed by Muccio, a known diplomat and expert on the Far East.

The biggest airport, Kimpho, near Seoul was reequipped as a military air-force base of the United States. By direction of the American government funds granted south Korea for assistance under the Marshall Plan were expended for the purpose. In order to hide their war preparation in south Korea, the US government made a racket in the press about the transfer of Kimpho airport from the military authorities to the civil "government" of south Korea. However, it soon became known that the US government and the south Korean "government" had signed a special agreement by which this airport was handed over to the United States as an air-force base.

The American commanders executed great works for reconstruction and widening the biggest ports in south Korea—Pusan and Inchon. New berths were built, powerful cranes set up and coastal fortifications built. Pusan and Inchon became the main naval bases of the United States in south Korea. US naval bases were also built in Jinhae, Pohang, Masan, Ryosu and Jeju Island.

Along the 38th parallel a "defence line" consisting of many fortifications, including concrete structures, was rapidly built.

Despite the general decline of railway transport in south Korea, only the railway trunk lines Pusan-Seoul and Inchon-Seoul and railways leading from Seoul to the 38th parallel were maintained in good condition. These railways were intended for the transport of troops and war materiel and were under the direct control of Americans.

The United States did not hide its intention to

use south Korea as a base for the preparation for aggressive war in Asia.

The American journalist Edgar Snow wrote in the beginning of 1946 that, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the highest military-operational organ), "At present Korea is part of American borders" and it should be used for the struggle against the Soviet Union in a military-strategic respect. The *Time* stressed that "Korea can become the dominant base on the east coast of Asia."

The New York newspaper *Journal American* concretely described the content of the Pentagon's plans in October 1947, "Safety of the United States in the Far East requires that a powerful base be built on Kvelpart Island known to the Japanese as Saishu Island and to the Koreans as Jeju Island. This strategically located island of 750 square miles presents an excellent air and submarine base 62 miles south of the extremity of the Korean peninsula. From it planes can strike any point in northern Asia."

The Americans considered that domination over Korea was the key to penetration into Asia. They held forth without hesitation that "in the light of the strategic location of Korea in northeast Asia control of Korea and its population... will considerably strengthen the position of our country." It was by no means fortuitous that MacArthur declared: "We will defend Korea as we defend our nation and as we defend California."

Special envoy of the US President on the question of indemnity Edwin Foray, who visited south

Korea toward the end of May and the beginning of June 1946, wrote in a letter sent to Truman: "Frankly, I am very worried about the position of the United States in Korea. Korea is the field of ideological warfare where success of the United States in Asia will be decided. In other words, I think Korea will become a testing ground, deciding the question as to whether democracy (American-*Editor*) will hold out or communism, succeeding the ruining feudalism, will get the upper hand." (Truman, *Memoirs*, Jap. ed., Kobunsha, 1966, p. 224.)

The United States designated south Korea as the forward base in the Far East for its military-strategic and political importance.

Founding of the "National Defence Force"

Americans considered it one of the main tasks of their mission in south Korea to create an armed force. As soon as the "administration agreement" was concluded, they, without delay, set to work organizing the "army of the Republic of Korea" ("ROK"). The United States handed over to south Korea 105- and 57-mm guns, planes, warships and a large number of Japanese weapons received as a result of disarmament of the Japanese army. Formation of a regular south Korean army was proclaimed on September 1, 1948.

Already in August 1947 Syngman Rhee said, "It is posed as an urgent task to form in the first place 100,000 strong army with the help of the United

States," *Stars and Stripes* said that "the ruling circles of the United States considered that to occupy north Korea it is rather necessary to create well-armed 100,000 strong army."

After the organization of the "ROK" army Syngman Rhee enlisted large numbers of the former officers of the Japanese army in the south Korean army with a view to strengthening its commanding staff. A "bill on organizing the ROK army" was adopted in the "National Assembly" on November 30, 1948. Infantry regiments were formed, later reorganized into divisions. Thus the ground forces of the "ROK" army had eight divisions: First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Capital Divisions.

A former Major in the Japanese army, Chae Pyong Dok, was appointed Chief of General Staff of the newly formed army. He had graduated from the Japanese Military Academy, and taught at the Japanese Ordnance School. Ri Ung Jun, who fled from the north, was appointed Chief of General Staff of the ground forces; Jong Il Gwon, a graduate from the Manchukuo Cadet School and Japanese Military Academy became Assistant Chief of General Staff of the ground forces. Pro-Japanese and pro-American elements were appointed commanding officers of the newly reorganized divisions. The former regimental commander of the Japanese army, Kim Sok Won, was appointed commander of the First Division and Ri Hyong Gun, commander of the Eighth Division.

Detailed data about the command staff of the south Korean army are given in the *Collection of*

Army War History published in Japan; Generals Ryu Sung Ryol, Chae Pyong Dok, Ri Jong Chan, Kim Jong Ryol, Jong Il Gwon, Yu Jae Hung, Ri Hyong Gun, Park Jung Hee and others were graduates from the Japanese Military Academy. They constituted the core of the south Korean army.

In addition, volunteers recruited at one time into the Japanese army, Japanese policemen, and those who fled from north to south joined this army as officers. The majority of noncommissioned officers were former servicemen of the Japanese army.

Along with the buildup of the ground forces, the air force was strengthened. On September 13, 1948, the former air base unit was reorganized into the air base command, and flying corps and air base units were newly formed. On December 1, 1948, the "Korean Garrison Air Force Command" was reorganized into the "Army Air Force Command", and on October 1, 1949, the air force was separated from the ground forces. On January 14, 1949, the Air Force Officers School was founded in Kimpho County, Kyonggi Province, and "female air force training corps" was even set up.

The naval fleet expanded rapidly. The coastal guards were reorganized into the naval force. Many former officers of the Japanese navy were enlisted in it. On May 5, 1949, a marine corps was formed.

Preparation for a new war in Korea was clearly visible in the sharp increase of ground, naval and air forces.

According to data published in south Korea, the

strength of the south Korean army in 1950 was indicated by the following figures:

Ground forces	8 divisions (67,416 strong)
Supporting units	27,558 strong
Total	94,974 strong
Naval force	7,715 strong
Air force	1,899 strong
Marine corps	1,166 strong
Sum total	105,754 strong

The south Korean armed forces, including the air force, were speedily equipped with American weapons, munitions and combat techniques. Supply of armaments and other means of destruction constituted the main item of the so-called assistance of the United States to starving and distressed south Korea.

In order to equip the south Korean army, Americans used the restored Japanese war industry.

In accordance with a secret agreement of MacArthur and Syngman Rhee, armaments were supplied to south Korea from Japan in exchange for strategic raw materials and foodstuffs.

Completing and training of the south Korean army were carried out under the command of American officers. American military advisors were in all south Korean units and combined units. Thus the south Korean army was placed under the complete control of the United States. The US army newspaper reported: "Military authorities of the

United States are striving to register able officers for work with Korean security troops for the coming years. This work is considered permanent to such an extent that officers expressing the wish to take it are allowed to take their families with them.” (*Stars and Stripes*, September 5, 1948.)

The American military advisors in the south Korean army were invested with unlimited rights. Seoul newspapers and journals repeatedly reported that American officers could not only punish Korean soldiers and officers for discipline, but also shoot them on the spot for slight insubordination. They had the right to arrest and kill not only south Korean servicemen, but also civilians and were not to bear responsibility for it.

On July 1, 1949, the United States concluded with the Seoul “government” an agreement on creation of a US Military Advisory Group in south Korea.

According to Article 1 of the agreement, the aim of the US Military Advisory Group was to strengthen the “ROK” army by assisting the south Korean “government” in organization, management and training of the “ROK” army, including ground, naval and air forces and the marine corps, helping the “ROK” army make effective use of the military assistance of the United States.

This agreement envisaged further strengthening of American economic and political control in south Korea, an increase in the “ROK” army and its complete subordination to the US military command.

On June 5, 1950, the head of the US Military Advisory Group, Roberis, said in a press interview

that each division of the south Korean army had 13 or 14 American military advisors who worked, fought and rested with the officers of the "ROK" army at the front along the 38th parallel.

According to Truman, "Taxpayers of the United States have in Korea an excellent shepherd guarding the investment of our country—an armed force which guarantees maximum success with minimum expenditure." (Message sent to Congress on July 7, 1949.)

Combat training and operational preparation in the "ROK" army followed an American pattern. From 1950, in accordance with "Educational Programme No. 1" of the "Ministry of Defence," a six-month general tactical training was conducted in units and regiments.

In addition, the United States regularly sent south Korean officers for training to the US troops quartered in Japan. Their training was conducted in the 24th Division, stationed in Kyushu and Yamaguchi Prefecture of Japan.

Commander of this division, Dean, wrote in his *Memoirs* that training of the officers of the "ROK" army continued till the beginning of war in Korea.

Concerning the intensive training of the south Korean army, General Roberts said in a press interview on June 5, 1950, "Thanks to the effective and intensive activity of 500 experienced servicemen, 100,000 men called to fight for you are being trained in south Korea."

A former chief of public relations of MacArthur's Command, Sebald, did not hide the character of the "ROK" army. He said that before the beginning of the Korean war the head of the US Military Advi-

sory Group, Roberts, together with the Defence Minister of the south Korean government, Sin Song Mo, Chief of General Staff Chae Pyong Dok and other generals often visited Japan, where they coordinated their actions.

The US military command paid serious attention to the preparation of strategic reserves. On November 20, 1948, in "President's urgent order" Syngman Rhee declared the introduction of the "provisional law on military service in the National Protection Army". On this basis a paramilitary organization, "National Protection Army" was formed, into which middle-aged men as well as youth in south Korea were forcibly enlisted. According to data published by the south Korean military authorities, on January 10, 1949, four brigades of reserves with the strength of 40,000 men were formed.

Military authorities declared that the "National Protection Army" as a component part of the ground forces must be a reinforcement of the regular army. It was divided into two groups—combat and special groups—so that in case of necessity they could be included in the regular army.

Publication of the "law on military service" on August 6, 1949, was another step on the way to creating strategic reserves. A military headquarters for the mobilization of youth, which took charge of conscription of youth and middle-aged men, was set up in each provincial capital.

The paramilitary organization "Youth Defence Corps" was formed on the basis of "Taehan Young Men's Association" in November 1949 in order to

conduct systematic military training of the pre-call-up youth. The training department of ground forces headquarters set up the “Youth Defence Training School” and “Youth Defence Corps Cadre Training School” to give anti-communist education and American-style training.

The “Youth Defence Corps” outnumbered the regular south Korean army many times in strength.

In his *Modern History of Korea* the US specialist in the history of Korea, David W. Conde, said that the “National Young Men’s Association” founded by Ri Pom Sok, “Taedong Young Men’s Association” under Ri Chong Chon and a number of other youth organizations conducted military training of right-wing youth. In October 1948 members of these associations numbered 1.25 million men.

South Korea under US military occupation resembled the former Japanese colony when the Japanese enlisted Korean youth in military service as “volunteers.”

An atmosphere of military hysteria enveloped all of south Korea. The critical moment leading inevitably to war came.

“Northward March” Plan

While conducting military activity against the Korean people in the south of the country, Seoul “leaders” at the same time promoted large-scale preparation for war against the “external enemy”—Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

In September 1949 Syngman Rhee said that

“Koreans will fight against Pyongyang if Americans give them weapons in needed quantity.” In the beginning of 1950 someone in Seoul asserted that the south Korean army was the “strongest army In Asia” and that it could annihilate the north Korean army. (*The Riddle of MacArthur*, Jap. ed., Jiji News Agency, 1951, p. 258.)

The south Korean “government” worked out a “northward march” plan in close contact with American specialists.

The first draft plan appeared towards the end of 1948. In the spring of 1949 the plan was basically worked out.

One May day the ambassador of the United States in south Korea, Muccio, invited to his study the Defence Minister, Sin Song Mo, and the Minister of Home Affairs, Kim Hyo Sok, and gave instructions: “To keep everything in readiness, exert effort to bring the time of general offensive as early as possible in the region north of the 38th parallel.” (*Documentary Evidence for Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, Kaebiyok Newspaper Company, 1951, pp. 113-116.)

According to data disclosed in Japan, members of the secret organization KATO took part in working out the plan. KATO was comprised of the former deputy chief of general staff of the Japanese army Kawabe, Arisue, Tanaka, Ono and other leading members of the general staff. The head of the US Military Advisory Group, William Roberts, Jong Il Gwon, Kim Sok Won and other generals of the south Korean army also took part in working out the “northward march” plan.

A colonel in the former Japanese army who took part in drawing up this operational plan on the eve of the Korean war said to Kamura Masamitsu, author of the book *Japanese General in the Korean War*, as follows:

“Operations in the Far East were planned to be carried out in three stages. Seizure of Korea was the task of the first stage.

“For this purpose ten divisions of the south Korean army and US troops were concentrated along the 38th parallel and two operating sectors—eastern and western—were formed.

“The western sector of the front was to advance directly toward Pyongyang with simultaneous landing operations by naval and air forces in the region north of Pyongyang.

“The eastern sector of the front was to advance from the left flank toward Yangdok and, maintaining contact between Pyongyang and Wonsan, attack Wonsan from the right flank. The marine corps would execute landing operations in the region north of Wonsan.

“The two sectors would advance to the River Amnok. Then, pursuing the remainder of the People’s Army, they would break through the Korean-Manchurian frontier. With this the first stage of the operation would be completed

“The second stage of operation would begin with the breakthrough on the Korean-Manchurian frontier.

“Rearmed Japanese troops and the Kuomintang army would officially take part in the operation.”

A concrete war plan was drawn up in Seoul.

According to the testimony of Kim Hyo Sok, he more than once visited the US embassy at the call of Muccio and directly received instructions on preparation for the “northward march”.

The plan of military actions of the south Korean army was worked out by Roberts. He was assisted by the commander of the First Division, Kim Sok Won, and the minister of communication of the Seoul “government”, Ho Jong.

The plan of military actions for the “northward march” drawn up by Roberts envisaged carrying out the operation from June to August 1949 simultaneously on the “western and eastern sectors of the front.” The First Division, which was to act in the western sector, had to deliver the main blow.

In the words of Kim Hyo Sok, the so-called plan of “northward march” envisaged that the First Division, under the direct command of Roberts, would advance as the shock force. For the purpose it was decided to increase its strength to that of corps, concentrating its main forces in the region of Ongjin and Kaesong, and to place the First Division under the command of Kim Sok Won.

The western sector would undertake the general offensive and the eastern sector would only cover it. It was envisaged to set up a commandant's office in Inchon in case the war situation developed favourably. The attack was to begin at Kaesong, occupy Kumgyo and take Pyongyang if things went well.

Eloquent testimony to the military actions of the “northward march” was borne by the operational map, on a scale of 1:1,000,000, that was seized by

the Korean People's Army in the headquarters of the ground forces of the "ROK" army on June 28, 1950, at the time of the liberation of Seoul. This map was printed in 1945 in the US military printing house for military maps. Lines, arrows and other signs drawn on this map revealed the plan of military actions of the "ROK" army for the "northward march." It was envisaged to deploy two corps (ten divisions) for the "northward march" along the 38th parallel.

It was planned to undertake military actions simultaneously: The First Army in the region from Koryangpho northeast of Kaesong to the west coast, the Second Army in the sector from Koryangpho to the east coast.

Along with these military actions in the region of the 38th parallel it was envisaged to land troops under cover of aviation at two points on the east and west coasts; Hanchon on the west coast (Phyongwon County, South Phyongan Province) and Hanam-ri on the east coast (Kumyar County, South Hamgyong Province).

Preparations were carried out by plan.

First: Work to fortify military bases. Roberts planned to accelerate the building of airfields as a measure to prepare for the "northward march".

Toward the end of April 1949 in the office of the Defence Minister, where Roberts, Sin Song Mo, Chae Pyong Dok and Kim Hyo Sok had gathered, Roberts stressed: "Airfields are badly needed for the suppression of guerrillas as well as for the northward march in future. Therefore I ask you to pay special attention to this. Above all it is urgently

needed to build airfields in Yongju and Wonju. This is an urgent task. I want you to give immediately instructions to build airfields there and join efforts for the purpose.”

Roberts’ instructions as to accelerating the construction of airfields in Yongju (North Kyongsang Province) and Wonju (Kangwon Province) suggest that the “northward march” plan envisaged not local military actions or a temporary armed invasion, but a large-scale total war with the use of air forces. This clearly shows that in the “northward march” plan of 1949 the United States planned large-scale use of its air corps besides the air corps of the “ROK” army based then at airfields in Kimpho, Suwon, Taegu, Kunsan, Kwangju and Jeju Island.

After receiving Roberts’ instructions the Ministry of Home Affairs of Syngman Rhee’s “government” forcibly mobilized local inhabitants, particularly farmers, and expedited in earnest construction of the airfields in Wonju near the 38th parallel on the east coast.

The American strategists, in drawing up the “northward march” plan, also envisaged participation of US Navy in the Korean war and for the purpose planned operational inspection of naval bases on the spot, sending their fleet to south Korea. An example of this was the “visit” of a squadron of the US Pacific Fleet to south Korea.

In the summer of 1949 the squadron of the Pacific Fleet, composed of cruisers and destroyers under the command of US Rear Admiral Binford, called at south Korea on a “friendly visit”. Its aim

was to examine once again the state of the US naval bases in south Korea before the “northward march” and at the same time obtain the consent of the south Korean ruling circles for the use of these ports in case of the outbreak of war.

At the time of this visit Binford showed a special interest in Jinhae Bay and received from Seoul the “right to the use of all naval bases of south Korea by the US fleet as temporary operational bases”.

In a letter to Chang Myon, south Korean ambassador to the United States, and Jo Pyong Ok, special envoy to the UN, Syngman Rhee wrote, “We had a visit from the squadron of the US Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. He was greatly impressed by Jinhae Bay. He recommended that I send a letter to the commander of the US Pacific Fleet to ask him to accept our proposal giving him the right to use all our free ports as temporary operational bases.”

On the same day, July 18, Chief of the General Staff of the south Korean naval force, Son Won Il, officially conveyed to Radford (commander of the US Pacific Fleet) that he was ready “to offer Inchon, Pusan, Ryosu, Mokpho and other ports, including the naval base in Jinhae, as temporary operational bases of the US Pacific Fleet.”

Second: With a view to ensuring security in the rear and military actions at the time of the “northward march” a mass arrest of dissenters from Syngman Rhee’s “government” in south Korea and particularly members of the Workers’ Party of south Korea was committed.

Third: In the summer of 1949 the “ROK” army was relocated, concentrating it along the 38th parallel:

Forward Area

Division	Place of Deployment	Place of Command
8th Div.	Kangrung & Jumunjin areas	Kangrung
6th Div.	Chunchon & Wonju areas	Wonju
7th Div.	Tongduchon area	Uijongbu
1st Div.	Kaesong area	Susaek
17th Reg. under direct control of Army Hq.	Ongjin area	Ongjin

Second-Line Area

Division	Place of Deployment	Place of Command
2nd Div.	Central area	Taejon
3rd Div.	Ryongnam area	Taegu
5th Div.	Honam area	Kwangju

Thus, the main force of the Seoul army was concentrated in the zone along the 38th parallel and the units deployed in the second-line area remained reserves of the main forces in the forward area.

Liberation Struggle in South Korea

Although the “ROK” army, founded in south Korea with the assistance of the United States, was intended for the fight against the external enemy, from the first days it had to fight against its own people.

The population in south Korea considered that the only way to get rid of the tyranny of the US-south Korean regime was to drive out the US occupiers, overthrow Syngman Rhee's "government" and achieve reunification of the country by setting up a unified Korean government.

The scope of the liberation struggle in south Korea grew steadily.

In 1949 punitive units were sent to Jeju Island. They burned all the villages and massacred the population in the way of their advance. In order to break the resistance of the inhabitants of the island they did not allow the farmers to harvest and killed everyone who appeared in the fields. In March an *AP* correspondent reported that 205 out of 400 villages on the island were destroyed or burned, 15,000 people were killed and 65,000 became homeless.

The heroic resistance of the population of Jeju Island was part of the struggle of all the working people of south Korea. Guerrilla struggle was widely conducted, particularly in South Jolla Province, North Jolla Province and North Kyongsang Province.

Syngman Rhee's "government" threw in their armed forces to suppress the activity of guerrillas. Three divisions were sent to the regions around Mt. Jiri and Mt. Thaebaek. The head of the US Military Advisory Group, Roberts, directly commanded the military actions of these divisions.

Hundreds of rural villages were burned and men and women, old and young, were killed or hanged without trial and investigation.

Captured guerrilla women were raped, their breasts cut out and their eyes gouged out. The tongues and ears of children were cut off.

The New York Times' Seoul correspondent had to admit in a report published in March 1950: "In many regions of south Korea reigns terror, which perhaps has no equal in the world. ... The armed people captured by the government troops are taken to their home villages and shot without any trial and their bodies are hanged as a warning to others."

In order to deprive guerrillas of the support of the local inhabitants Syngman Rhee's "government" evicted all the inhabitants to a man from the regions implicated in the guerrilla movement. Those who resisted the forced eviction were shot on the spot. Several million people were forcibly evicted. Enormous masses of peaceful inhabitants deprived of their homes, property, fields and cattle were reduced to roaming beggars, destined to starve.

Not only guerrillas and the peaceful inhabitants who assisted them but also all the Korean patriots who stood for their people, reunification and independence of the country were cruelly persecuted without exception.

Under the so-called "National Security Law" enforced in November 1948, many people who took part in the national liberation movement were arrested and imprisoned or condemned to death. From September to October 1949 alone 132 political parties and public organizations were dissolved.

Americans and their puppets in Seoul tried to suppress the guerrilla activity with fire and sword, but the guerrilla struggle grew all the more in scope and became all the more organized.

Chiefly the mountainous regions of southern provinces were seized by the guerrilla movement. Extensive military operations of the guerrillas were conducted on Jeju Island. In 1949-1950 the combat capability of the guerrillas considerably increased. In the main guerrilla regions—South Jolla Province, North Kyongsang Province and Mt. Jiri, Mt. Thae-baek and Mt. Odae – troops 400 to 500 strong and more acted. Big guerrilla troops, cooperating with each other, began to conduct wide combat operations, deliver heavy blows at Syngman Rhee's regiments and divisions and liberate villages, cities and entire counties not only in mountainous regions but also in valleys. According to a report in the newspaper *Minju Joson* a considerable part of the population of 77 counties and 283 sub-counties of south Korea was involved in the guerrilla struggle in 1949. In the summer of 1949 the guerrillas controlled eight counties out of ten in Kangwon Province south of the 38th parallel, 14 out of 18 in North Kyongsang Province, 14 out of 21 in South Jolla Province and five out of seven in South Chung-chong Province.

In the course of battle the guerrillas armed themselves, seizing weapons brought to south Korea by Americans for arming Syngman Rhee's army.

In August battles alone they obtained 523 heavy and light US machine guns, a large number of rifles, bullets and other armaments and munitions.

In 1946-1948 the guerrillas were armed only with infantry weapons, but in 1949-1950 they had considerable numbers of mortars and guns seized in routing Syngman Rhee's troops.

Toward the end of 1949 a winter punitive operation against guerrillas was conducted. For the operation Syngman Rhee's troops and the US air force were thrown in. However, the winter punitive campaign of 1949-1950 against the guerrillas did not give the occupiers and their puppet army the desired result. Part was smashed by the guerrillas and yet another part, suffering great loss, had to retreat hastily to their base.

These events showed that the south Korean army was an unreliable support of the US-south Korean regime. Rebellion and uprising began to break out in it. Many small troops went over to the guerrillas.

Thus in October 1948 the 14th Regiment of Syngman Rhee's army rose in revolt, refusing to go out to suppress a people's uprising on Jeju Island. The insurgent soldiers seized the port city of Ryosu at once. Soldiers of other troops of the "ROK" army (the 6th Regiment in Taegu and the Fifth Regiment in Raju) joined the 14th Regiment. The insurgent soldiers seized Suncheon, Posong, Kurye, Kwangyang and other localities with the support of local inhabitants.

People's committees were set up in these cities.

The US command mobilized their armed forces in south Korea against the south Korean patriots who rose up in revolt. Thus they succeeded in suppressing rebellion with much difficulty.

Armed revolts broke out in Syngman Rhee's army even in 1949-1950. Several units and subunits and naval vessels of the Seoul "government" went over to the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In May 1949 two fully armed infantry battalions under the command of Phyo Mun Won and Kang Thae U went over to north Korea from south Korea. Phyo Mun Won said, "Syngman Rhee's 'government' forcibly conscripted sons of workers and farmers into the army. Our parents are found in miserable straits because of the existence of a reactionary regime in south Korea. Our defection to the north, democratic Korea, is not fortuitous. It is the result of US policy, which converted south Korea into a colony." On May 11, 1949, a naval vessel of Syngman Rhee's "government" went over to the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In August 1949 the flagship of patrol boats of the south Korean fleet went over to north Korea.

In 1949-1950 Seoul radio repeatedly reported the defection of separate units and small groups of soldiers and officers of Syngman Rhee's army to the side of the guerrillas.

After a number of mutinies a "cleaning of the army" was conducted. Progressive-minded officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers first fell victims of it. The aim of "cleaning the army" was to transform the "unreliable" troops of the "ROK" army into "reliable units." Investigation groups were formed with reactionary elements and cruel methods of examination were applied; 4,749 men had been executed by July 1949. "Cleaning the army" continued thereafter and toward the beginning of

the war 8,000 servicemen had been accused of being “red” and liquidated.

This noisy campaign, intended to ensure security in the rear, was undoubtedly connected with the preparation for war of the United States and Syngman Rhee’s “government”.

The Korean people did not want to tolerate the US occupation troops and the traitors to the nation installed in the government by them on their land.

All the political parties and public organizations of Korea (excepting Syngman Rhee’s Democratic Party) demanded the immediate withdrawal of the US occupation army from south Korea, because it was the basic condition for liquidation of the new colonial ruling system established in south Korea and for contributing to the earliest possible peaceful reunification of the country.

Section Two

The Northern Half of the Republic Obtains a Regular Army

Strengthening and Development of the Korean People’s Army as a Regular Army

The Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, the precursor of the KPA, was born on April 25, 1932.

The founding of the Korean People’s Army, that

is, strengthening and developing the Korean People's Revolutionary Army as a regular army, proceeded from historical necessity.

Comrade Kim Il Sung rightly stressed that military construction in the DPRK began with and was conducted on the principle of self-reliance.

"Self-reliance is a completely revolutionary stand for a people to accomplish the revolution in their country relying mainly on their own forces; it is an independent stand of building up their country through their own labour and with their own national resources." (Kim Il Sung, *Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. 21, p. 418.)

Already in the first days after the liberation of Korea Comrade Kim Il Sung set forth the revolutionary line of self-defence and on this basis clarified the strategic line of building a regular army. He resolutely rejected the schemes of enemies of the people to frustrate the building of regular armed forces and also the attacks of pacifists: "Why is an army needed before reunification?"

Building a regular army of the Korean people was carried out purposefully.

Under the difficult conditions of the early days after liberation, when qualified cadres were in dire shortage, Comrade Kim Il Sung turned due attention to the formation of a people's armed force, in the light of the practical experience of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the immediate strategic military tasks of the new Korean state. In order to train military and political cadres of worker and peasant origin, Pyongyang Institute was founded in November 1945 and the Central Security Cadres School in April 1946. A marine security

corps was formed in June 1946 and the Marine Security Cadres School was founded in July 1947. An air squadron was formed in August 1947.

All these laid the foundation of the military cadre policy of the future DPRK.

On February 8, 1948, the first military review of the armed forces of the DPRK was held in Pyongyang.

At the review Comrade Kim Il Sung made a speech, *On the Occasion of the Founding of the Korean People's Army*.

He said:

"The People's Army we have founded today is an army of a new type, fundamentally different from that of a capitalist country."

In contrast to the army of a capitalist country, "the army we have created today is a genuine people's army made up of the sons and daughters of the workers, peasants and other sections of the Korean working people, which fights for the liberation and independence of the Korean nation and for the happiness of the masses against the imperialist aggressive forces from abroad and the reactionary forces at home. ...

"Another specific feature of our People's Army is that its backbone is composed of true patriots of Korea who devoted their all in the past to the anti-Japanese armed struggle for the liberation of the country and the people in the face of brutal Japanese imperialist suppression." (Kim Il Sung, *Works*. Vol. 4, pp. 86-87.)

Comrade Kim Il Sung went on to say, "... though our People's Army is established today as

the regular army of democratic Korea, it is, in reality, an army long rooted in the past. It is a glorious army inheriting the revolutionary traditions of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, invaluable battle experience and indomitable patriotic spirit." (*Ibid.*, p. 88.)

In the DPRK obligatory military service was not introduced. The People's Army was kept up to strength with ordinary men through voluntary enrolment. Representatives of all walks of life, all political parties and public organizations that joined the United Democratic Front of the Fatherland could serve in the army. However, precedence was given to workers and poor peasants. It is necessary to stress that there was no shortage of volunteers.

Patriots who lived in different regions of foreign countries, displaced by foreign imperialists, returned to the DPRK to work for the motherland. Several thousand Koreans returned to north Korea from Manchuria and joined the army voluntarily. The majority of them had taken part in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese imperialists and therefore were possessed of experience in the art of fighting.

Comrade Kim Il Sung became the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army. This event had double significance. First, it confirmed that Comrade Kim Il Sung had become the political and military head of the new state by his distinguished service; second, it opened wide the possibility for him to give full play to his talent as a political leader and military strategist.

With the founding of the Korean People's Army the Korean people came to have a modern national

army and a reliable guarantee for the sovereignty and independence of the country.

The Army Grows in Strength and Experience

Commanders of all branches of arms and services and combined units of the Korean People's Army were well prepared professionals. They went through a big revolutionary school as commanding officers in the ranks of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, which General Kim Il Sung early commanded.

Officers of the KPA were trained in their own military schools. They enriched their knowledge in the different military training camps for commanding officers of combined units and in the training conducted in the headquarters and troops. Political and moral education of men of the KPA was led by the Workers' Party of Korea. The duty of political worker in the combined units and units was done by members of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The main emphasis in the work with men of the KPA was on educating men and officers in fidelity to the people's democratic system.

The Juche idea ran through educational work from the beginning.

Clarifying the ideological system of Juche in his works, Comrade Kim Il Sung set forth the famous guiding principle of the Juche idea—independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy and self-defence in national defence.

The KPA was equipped with up-to-date weapons.

Commanding officers of the KPA paid serious attention to education in night military action.

Without going into details about the buildup of the KPA, it should be stressed that it was fully possessed of the art of defeating the enemy by decisive attack together with stubborn defence.

Leaders of north Korea showed concern about stimulating patriotic service to the motherland by official commendation.

Already in October 1948 the system of conferring orders and medals was introduced in north Korea. Later, the title of hero was instituted.

Fulfilling the requirements of military doctrine, the KPA quickly solved the main tasks. The armed forces of the DPRK had a distinct organizational structure. These were ground, naval and air forces. In other words, the DPRK was prepared to repulse the enemy on the ground and sea and in the air.

The young regular army of the DPRK had to fulfil two practical tasks: to steadily improve the soldiers' combat readiness and to foil the continued adventurous attempts of armed provocation of south Korea to "probe the fortress" of the DPRK with force of arms.

South Korea had earlier attempted to try the strength of the defence line of north Korea, but it was only a "needle's prick." Beginning in 1947, south Korean troops and police invaded areas north of the 38th parallel by companies and battal-

ions, which, occupying part of Kangwon and Hwanghae Provinces, perpetrated barbarous atrocities. The armed provocations of south Korea were an open challenge to the ardent desire of all the people of north and south Korea to defend their right to the peaceful reunification of the country.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said:

"In order to avoid extending clashes on the 38th parallel and the tragedy of fratricide, the Government of the Republic put up all along with the provocations by the Syngman Rhee's puppet army and police forces on thousands of occasions in recent two years; under the manipulation of the US imperialists they ceaselessly intruded into the area north of the 38th parallel, often kidnapping its inhabitants, raiding farmhouses, robbing them of their property, burning them down, and killing innocent people." (Kim Il Sung, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 88.)

Invasions of south Korean troops and police in areas north of the 38th parallel grew in scope. In 1949 alone battalions and regiments of the Eighth, First and Capital Divisions, special troops of "Horim" and "Paekkol" and south Korean police committed 2,617 armed invasions from air, sea and ground in regions north of the 38th parallel, in the sector from Pyoksong County of Hwanghae Province to Yangyang of Kangwon Province. This meant a daily average of more than seven armed provocations.

According to the testimony of Mun Hak Bong, political advisor of Syngman Rhee and advisor to the CIC, such armed sallies of the south Korean side were planned by the head of the US Military

Advisory Group and carried out under his direct guidance. Precisely, Roberts gave Chae Pyong Dok instructions as to attacking the north. Nearly all the conflicts, however small, were commanded by US military advisors.

The former Minister of Home Affairs, Kim Hyo Sok, confirmed: "Roberts gave the Chief of the General Staff of the south Korean army, Chae Pyong Dok, and the Commander of the First Division, Kim Sok Won, instructions as to beginning attacks on areas north of the 38th parallel at dawn on July 25."

Pae Yong Sik, who served in the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion of the 11th Regiment of the First Division of the "ROK" army and defected to the north on September 16, 1949, stated that the armed attack of the 11th Regiment was commanded by one captain and three lieutenants of the US army—advisors to this regiment.

The headquarters of the ground forces of the "Ministry of National Defence" of the south Korean "government" mobilized the First Division of the south Korean army to occupy heights of tactical significance in Kachon Sub-County, Pyoksong County, Hwanghae Province, and fired over 20,000 shells and bullets to areas of north Korea from May 21 to 26, 1949. On the night of May 27, 350 soldiers of this division invaded Kachon Sub-County, but were repulsed, resisted by the north Korean security force defending the area.

To retaliate and occupy Mt. Kuksa, Height 112 and Height 129 in the region of Pyoksong north of the 38th parallel, the south Korean army undertook

attack on May 31, mobilizing two reinforced infantry battalions and the "Paekkol unit" under cover of airplanes. This time, too, they were repulsed by the stubborn resistance of the north Korean security force. Then the south Korean army concentrated five battalions of the First Division on the line of Ongjin and again attacked at dawn on June 7 under cover of machine-gun fire and airplanes. Meanwhile, it sent two companies to Jungjik-dong to envelop the north Korean security force and advanced more than one battalion to Mt. Unpha, Mt. Kkachi and Mt. Pidulgi to scatter the security force of the Republic. Height 112, Height 84, Mt. Unpha, Mt. Pidulgi and Mt. Kkachi were temporarily occupied by the south Korean army.

However, the plan of the south Korean army to occupy Pyoksong County was frustrated. The north Korean security force guarding the region cleared the heights of the enemy with the positive support of the local inhabitants, routing the invading south Korean troops. The south Korean army threw more than 3,700 men into the battle, but lost over 1,300 men, dead or wounded, and over 60 men were taken prisoner. The enemy took to flight, leaving many weapons, including heavy machine guns and rocket guns.

The south Korean army repeatedly invaded Yangyang County of Kangwon Province under the command of members of the US Military Advisory Group from June to July 1949, with a view to avenge its heavy defeat in the area of Pyoksong County and seize tactical strongholds for the "northward march."

As early as February 1949 about 1,300 soldiers of the "ROK" army and police invaded Kosan Peak in Yangyang County, but, meeting the mortal counterattack of the security force of the DPRK defending the area, took to flight. However, they did not give up their plan to take this region and seize the height, favourable for further attack.

A reinforced enemy battalion invaded the region of Yongdok-ri and Kongsujon-ri of So Sub-County, Yangyang County, in order to camouflage the direction of the main blow. Meeting the powerful counterblow of the security force defending this region, they tried to encircle Kosan Peak.

At dawn on July 6 the south Korean army simultaneously began frontal, left- and right-flank attacks on Kosan Peak after a 40-minute preparatory artillery barrage, but the attacks were checked by the stubborn defence of the security force of the DPRK, who, pursuing the retreating enemy, dealt one blow after another at him and threw him back to south of the 38th parallel. As a result, the attempt of the "ROK" army to occupy Kosan Peak was foiled.

Soldiers of the security force of the Republic annihilated over 250 men of the enemy, took over 30 prisoners and captured a large amount of combat equipment.

Making an armed attack on Pyoksong County of Hwanghae Province and Kosan Peak in Kangwon Province, the "ROK" army at the same time tried to occupy Mt. Songak (Height 488.2), located in Ryongnam Sub-County, Jangphung County, South Hwanghae Province, north of the 38th parallel, and

create favourable conditions for further “northward march.” Mt. Songak was an important tactical point for both sides— south and north. If Mt. Songak had been taken by the “ROK” army, the frontier guards of the Republic would have had to retreat to rear positions far from the front line. Therefore, Syngman Rhee’s army repeatedly undertook sudden attacks on the height, but each time suffered defeat. In the beginning of May about one battalion of the south Korean army attempted to occupy Mt. Songak under cover of artillery fire, but, meeting powerful resistance, retreated, leaving over 100 soldiers, dead or wounded.

However, at dawn on July 25, 1949, battalions of the 11th Regiment of the First Division of Syngman Rhee’s army suddenly attacked Mt. Songak under cover of artillery fire and occupied it. Striving to follow up the success, the south Korean army hastily prepared defence positions and reinforced their troops, but as a result of the well-prepared counterattack of units of the security force, the south Korean army was beaten back from Mt. Songak on the evening of July 29. In this battle more than 300 men and officers of the enemy were wounded and taken prisoner and a large number of weapons and combat equipment were captured.

Armed invasion north of the 38th parallel took place also in the region of Mt. Unpha in Pyoksong County. Mt. Unpha had important significance for defence of Pyoksong and Chwiya, located north-west of Haeju. Towards the end of June 1949 the south Korean army occupied it and held it for almost four months, building defence positions,

having forcibly mobilized the local inhabitants for the purpose. On its northern slope the main positions, with 47 weapon emplacements and trenches, were built. More than one battalion defended these positions. As reserves of the "combat command in Ongjin" one battalion was placed in Kangryong and another battalion and two batteries west of Ongjin.

On October 14, after a counterattack by units of the security force of the Republic, the region of Mt. Unpha was liberated from the units of Syngman Rhee's army. They launched 32 counterattacks, but could not restore the situation. In the battles on Mt. Unpha, which lasted for more than 100 days, the units of the south Korean army lost more than 1,200 men.

Armed provocations by south Korea were also committed from the sea.

One was the raid of the warships of the south Korean army in Monggumpho Bay (Hwanghae Province), committed on August 18, 1949. As the commander of the First Fleet of the south Korean navy, Ri Ryong Un, admitted, the attack on Monggumpho was made on the personal instructions of Syngman Rhee and Sin Song Mo ("Minister of National Defence").

The south Korean side did not confine itself to using only the regular army in testing the strength of the defence line of north Korea. They widely employed specially trained subversive groups and also spies and terrorists, with a view to creating an atmosphere of unrest and lack of confidence among the population. Subversive and terrorist groups were formed from members of fascist orga-

nizations—"Taehan Young Men's Association", "Minbo Association" and "Association of Young Men from the Northwest." They destroyed important elements of the national economy and communications and killed leaders of the party, people's government and public organizations. Murder and arson caused unrest and alarm among the inhabitants. For example, the Fifth Battalion of "Horim unit" (special troops) basing itself in the mountainous areas of Kanghyon and Sokcho Sub-Counties of Yangyang County, located in the depth of the region north of the 38th parallel, raided populated areas at night, burned houses, killed and kidnapped people. The Sixth Battalion of "Horim unit" penetrated mountainous areas of Puk and Sohwa, Sub-Counties of Rinje County, Kangwon Province, where they plundered shops and clinics, took foodstuffs from farmers, kidnapped and killed local inhabitants.

The security force of the Republic pursued the "Horim unit", encircling and completely annihilating it on July 5, 1949.

Thus a "small war" was waged along the 38th parallel in 1949.

In the course of armed provocations the south Korean side suffered great loss. However, it could not attain its aim. At the conference of commanders of divisions, convened by the headquarters of the ground forces in October 1949, Roberts had to admit: "Many attacks on the region north of the 38th parallel were started by my decision, but were of no use and caused great loss, to say nothing of consumption of a large amount of ammunition."

Section Three

Spring Is Compressed Inexorably

War Plan Is Reexamined in Seoul

The year 1949 marked a milestone of history in many respects. A confrontation of the world's forces was finally formed: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established.

Two historical events took place in the second half of 1949.

The test of an atomic bomb in the Soviet Union was carried out successfully, putting an end to the US monopoly of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese communists won victory in the war against the Kuomintang in October and proclaimed the People's Republic of China.

The dogged attempts of the United States to include all of Korea in the region of Western democracy by means of force were unsuccessful. However, instead of drawing lessons from ignominious defeat in armed conflicts, Washington and Seoul advanced along the path of war.

Incidentally, there could be no other solution, for the US ruling circles believed in the "omnipotence" of the United States.

The Defense Department of the United States,

receiving from Roberts reports about battle results in the “small war” on the 38th parallel, was obliged to reexamine the original plan of war: “to push the 38th parallel beyond the banks of the River Amnok.” Unlike Syngman Rhee, the leadership of the Defense Department considered it impossible to defeat north Korea with only Syngman Rhee’s army.

Therefore, Washington deeply analysed all the factors and conditions characterizing the balance of forces and made serious corrections in Seoul’s war plan. Reconsideration of a war plan is always accompanied by many difficulties. The following events give an idea of the essence of corrections made in Seoul’s plan of the Korean war.

The main principles were as follows:

1. To put off the beginning of the Korean war until the summer of 1950 and fully complete war preparations in this period.

2. To carry out supplementary investigation into the military policy and strategy of north Korea and decide on the real defence capability of the DPRK.

The document Jo Pyong Ok, former ambassador of south Korea in the United States, made public is significant. In a letter (dated November 3, 1949) sent to Syngman Rhee he said: “I am firmly convinced that unification of Korea can be achieved only through the exercise of sovereignty of our government. Cold war cannot be continued without end. No international problems can be solved without a third world war. The most important task of our government is the preparation of economic and military strength.” (*Who Began the Kore-*

an War?, Jap. ed., Ketsuyo Bookstore, 1952, p. 28.)

Later Rim Pyong Jik, foreign minister of south Korea, also admitted: "Of course, our aim was to unify the country under the rule of Syngman Rhee. With this in view, we started a war." The beginning of war was postponed. Why? Above all, because war preparations had not matured in the light of materiel. In addition, Washington felt uneasy about the unreliability of the south Korean army and inconsistency of the strategic rear of south Korea. The situation as a whole was appraised as favourable in Washington because:

1. The USSR, considering the international situation, was not likely to advance its army into Korea;
2. The possibility that the Chinese communist army would intrude into south Korea was excluded;
3. The north Korean communist army could not attack the south on its own initiative, for it was weaker than the south Korean army in military strength and equipment.

Therefore, Washington decided to accelerate war preparations as much as possible.

The scheme of the American strategists was disclosed by Colonel Eida (expert in the command of MacArthur in Japan, who was well acquainted with information about the American plan of unification of Korea, later the US military advisor in Iran). He said that "the US plan for Korean unification was to occupy the territory of Korea north of the 38th parallel with Syngman Rhee's troops' direct participation and the assistance of the US ground and naval forces." (*Crossroads*, December 22, 1950.)

Stance of the United States to direct military

intervention in the affairs of Korea is also affirmed by the testimony of Kim Hyo Sok.

According to it, in January 1950, when the Secretary of Defense Department of the United States, Royall, and the chief of public relations of MacArthur's command, Sebald, visited Seoul, the latter assured Syngman Rhee: "If the expedition against the North is launched, American naval and air force units stationed in Japan will be sent immediately to support south Korea. As far as naval and air forces are concerned, you have nothing to worry about."

According to the testimony of Kim Hyo Sok, in June 1950 Dulles who visited Seoul assured Syngman Rhee and Sin Song Mo: "If ROK army can but hold out for two weeks, everything will go smoothly, for during this period the USA, by accusing north Korea of attacking south Korea, will compel the United Nations to take action. And in the name of the United Nations, land, naval and air forces will be mobilized." (*Documentary Evidence for the Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, Kaebiyok Newspaper Company, 1951, p. 128.)

The "northward march" plan drawn up in the spring of 1949 envisaged attack by two corps of Syngman Rhee's army in cooperation with landing operations on the east and west coasts. The reexamined Seoul plan was amended so that the main forces of the "ROK" army were concentrated for a breakthrough of the 38th parallel, because landing troops in the rear of the enemy was considered an obvious adventure, and in such a case it would be impossible to claim an "armed attack of the north Korean army."

Changes in Seoul's operational plan required enhancing the role of Japan as the rear base, hence measures for maximal mobilization of her military and economic potentials were worked out. The main measures were: extension and construction of bases for transport of units of the US army, fleet and air force based in Japan; realization of the programme for a "Far East ordnance factory"; formation of an "anti-communist crusade army" with Japanese militarists; maximal use of the marine transport capacity of Japan for transport of war supplies to Korea.

Strategic Disinformation and Reconnaissance

Wars, as a rule, are prepared in secret. In order to hide their genuine intentions, the sides opposing each other resort to various tricks of strategic disinformation. Seoul and Washington did not abandon this principle.

The intention of Seoul and Washington was to spread false informations to convince the world that the north Korean army had attacked first and at the same time to bring the issue of the "aggression of north Korea" before the United Nations through the State Department, form UN Forces and thus legalize the military actions of the American armed forces in Korea under the sign of the United Nations.

The US State Department prepared a group for working out documents and basic draft resolutions

that would later be forced upon the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. This political plot was disclosed by the Assistant Secretary of State for UN affairs, Hickerson, at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee of the US Congress in June 1951. This fact is widely known, but we quote part of the testimony of this high-ranking official:

“Senator Ferguson: Did you have a plan laid out as to what you were going to do when you got notice of the attack?

Hickerson: We had done some thinking about that, sir, yes.

Ferguson: Well, thinking is rather indefinite. What had you done on paper? What had you planned to do?

Hickerson: We have planned to take it to the United Nations for immediate action.

Ferguson: Did you have a proposed resolution drawn up?

Hickerson: We knew we were going to take it to the United Nations. We knew in general what we were going to say.... We had a skeleton of a resolution here first.”

When Ferguson asked what he had been going to do when the Soviet delegate used his veto in the UN Security Council meeting, Hickerson said:

“We were going to request the UN Secretary-General to call a special session (The US could set its voting machine in motion, as the decision by majority principle was applicable here—*Editor*). We had organized a small group to draft a statement which we would issue in case the Soviet delegate

used his veto.” (*The Record of a Routine Hearing at the US Senate Appropriations Committee on the Budget of the Departments of States, Justice, Commerce and Courts for 1952*, pp. 1,086-1,087.)

In order to furnish strategic disinformation, the United States needed a “third person” who could present a false report about the “aggression of north Korea.” Hence the US State Department intended to invest the UN Commission on Korea with the right to “observe tranquility” and “military conflicts” on the 38th parallel.

In the autumn of 1949, under pressure from the United States, the United Nations replaced members of the UN Commission on Korea with countries more obedient to the United States. Syria, a “troublesome country,” was removed, Australia resigned and Turkey took its place.

On October 21, 1949, the United Nations set the “task of observation of military conflicts” before the UN Commission on Korea. In the opinion of the representative of the United States, by granting such an additional right the United Nations could receive all the necessary information about the conflict and its causes from the officially formed organ. The United States acquired legality for submitting the Korean question to the United Nations by adding “objectivity” and “legitimacy” to its “report on the situation.” In other words, the United States, by using the supplementary right of the commission, gained the possibility to distort the situation in Korea so as to favour implementation of its policy.

At the same time south Korea and the United States activated intelligence activity. Among the

secret documents seized at the time of liberation of Seoul City in June 1950 were plans A and B for intelligence activity worked out by the third section of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the ground forces in 1950 and a work plan for an intelligence corps from March to May 1950. They envisaged sending spies and wreckers to Pyongyang and other important cities and county seats for collection of military secret information; destroying all the main railway trunk lines, electric power stations, radio broadcasting stations, and big factories, and setting fire to the buildings of democratic political parties and even cultural establishments, such as the State Art Theatre. In addition, they planned to commit heavy crimes—mass destruction of urban populations by scattering bacteria in nine main cities and reservoirs of the northern part of the country and also assassination of responsible workers of the Party, government and army.

Such intelligence activity against north Korea testifies that this “work plan” pursued the main aim to weaken and destroy the political, economic and military potentials of north Korea and to cause public alarm by means of psychological warfare.

These plans for intelligence activity of the headquarters of Seoul’s ground forces were drawn up with the direct participation of the United States.

Thus, in his office the chief of the general staff of the ground forces of the United States, General Wedemeyer, gave Chang Myon instructions: “To send to north Korea well-prepared, reliable and able youth and create an atmosphere of distrust of the communist party and the government among

inhabitants and prepare them to serve south Korea.” Wedemeyer himself promised to do all in his power for this and consult with Secretary of State Department Acheson. (*Documentary Evidence for the Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, Kaebyok Newspaper Company, 1951, p. 9.)

In order to intensify intelligence activity against north Korea, in 1949 the United States moved the Far East headquarters of the CIA to Tokyo from Manila.

It is necessary to stress that the Japanese militarists who played an important role as the leading staff of MacArthur’s command took part in these war preparations. In his secret letter dated January 11, 1950, to Syngman Rhee the south Korean ambassador in the United States, Chang Myon said about some encouraging news which he received confidentially from a top-level, reliable source in the Pentagon: “The State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with the respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position.

“... there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on Mt. Paektu, for the President’s order will remove the principal and important obstacle.” (*Documentary Evidence for the Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, Kaebyok Newspaper Company, 1951, p. 79.)

In order to send soldiers to battle and fully mobilize the material and mental potential of the population in the rear, it is necessary to arm citizens with a stereotyped “image of the enemy” along with

other favourable conditions. It is required to convince one's citizens that the given military violence is undertaken in the "interests of the nation." For the purpose various propaganda slogans, such as "Struggle for restoration of historical justice," "For liberty and independence" and "For restoration of territory," are usually used.

It is understandable that a certain "enemy" hinders achievement of these "national objectives."

Creation of an "image of the enemy" was always one of the main tasks of the political leadership of a country pursuing an expansionist policy.

Analysis of the propaganda materials of the Seoul regime on the eve of the war makes it possible to come to an entirely definite conclusion: The DPRK and the USSR and the People's Republic of China, "standing behind her shoulders," were called the "enemy". Hence concrete combat task logically followed: to destroy the Korean "war machine" and to take all the territory of north Korea under control. This mission was qualified in official circles of Seoul and in Washington as a just, liberating and progressive one.

In propaganda materials south Korea was portrayed as the potential victim of aggression. The supposed models of "Pyongyang's war threat" were cited in the south Korean and American press.

In this connection information about war preparations of north Korea was systematically given. The mass conscription into the army of young people aged 17 to 28 was reported. "Facts" about the concentration of north Korean troops along the line

of the 38th parallel were cited. Reference was made to the military training and command staff training conducted in north Korea, at which “methods of fulfillment of combat tasks in the offensive are being perfected.” All kinds of data about the “rapid increase” of the strength and technical equipment of the People’s Army were cited.

At the same time the mass media reported that south Korea was not prepared for war. The appraisal of independent experts was cited, such as that of Australian researchers F. Rich and P. Rankin, who were in south Korea in the summer of 1950.

They asserted that the “ROK” army was organized exclusively for defence, it was not completely prepared for large-scale offensive action, it did not have enough tanks, planes or heavy artillery, it was dispersed all over the territory south of the 38th parallel, and most of its forces were diverted to the struggle against guerrillas.

The Australian researchers rightly pointed out that considerable forces of the south Korean army and police were mobilized in the struggle against the so-called insurgents—guerrillas at that time.

In 1949 the “special command of the US Army in the Far East” (headquarters in Japan) was founded, and in January 1950 a “US-south Korea mutual defense and aid pact” was concluded. The training conducted by US troops on Hokkaido in the beginning of June 1950—“training in a locality similar to north Korea”—was characterized accordingly in the spirit of the “cold war.” It was asserted that the “big military mission” was founded in south

Korea as assistance to the friends of the United States and their servicemen in the bases in Pusan, Inchon, Kimpho, Suwon, Kwangju, Taegu, Jinhae and on Jeju Island were preserved.

Materials about "strengthening the US-south Korea cooperation" held a conspicuous place in the general propaganda campaign.

According to the "mutual defence treaty," the United States was obligated: to give all kinds of political support to the south Korean "government"; to increase American investment in south Korea; to provide the armed forces of south Korea with corresponding military techniques; to train a definite number of military cadres for the "ROK" army; to maintain its military presence in south Korea at the necessary level; to extend military contacts with other American allies (including Japan).

It was asserted in the press that US military specialists also conducted the training of the south Korean army. In fact, American officers were in each division, regiment and even battalion of the Syngman Rhee's army. They not only were engaged in military training and ideological brainwashing of soldiers, but also actually commanded them. General Roberts, the head of the US Military Advisory Group, was actually the "supreme commander of the south Korean army."

The south Korean press consistently publicized the idea that the Syngman Rhee group could "overpower the north." In an interview with the correspondent of the United Press Syngman Rhee declared that the south Korean army was prepared for war and could "occupy Pyongyang in three

days" after the beginning of military action. (*Seoul Sinmun*, October 21, 1949.)

In the mass media wide publicity was given to a visit to Japan in mid-June 1950 of the US Secretary of Defense, Johnson, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley, and consultant to the State Department, Dulles. They had a conference with General MacArthur.

From June 7 Seoul conducted a large-scale radio war against north Korea in connection with the publicizing of the Appeal of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, in which elections to the "National Assembly" were characterized as anti-national.

The appeal of the north pointed out that "the Korean people never considered and will not consider the 38th parallel as the frontier of the state" and set forth a proposal for peaceful reunification of the country as follows:

1. To hold general elections in the whole territory of north and south from August 5 to 8 and found a unique supreme legislative body;

2. To convene a meeting of the supreme legislative body in Seoul on August 15, the fifth anniversary of liberation;

3. For the purpose, to convene a conference of representatives of the democratic political parties and public organizations of north and south Korea desiring peaceful reunification of the country in the period from June 15 to 17 in Haeju or in Kaesong. To discuss and adopt resolutions on the following problems at the conference: a) conditions of

peaceful reunification; b) procedure for holding general elections; c) formation of a central committee of guidance for elections;

4. Not to allow traitors to the nation, continuously opposing the peaceful reunification of the country, to take part in the work of the conference and not to permit the UN Commission on Korea to interfere in the work of reunification of the country;

5. During the period of the conference and general elections the authorities of north and south Korea are to bear responsibility for the maintenance of public order. (*Pravda*, June 10, 1950.)

Seoul responded with a declaration of "martial law" and the arrest of members of the "National Assembly" who sympathized with the appeal.

The south Korean mass media hushed up the following resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, dated June 19, 1950:

"Expressing the unshakable will of the Korean people for the reunification, independence and democratic development of the country and taking into account the desire of the democratic parties and public organizations, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK has decided to propose the following to the south Korean 'National Assembly':

"1. To effect the peaceful reunification of the country by merging the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK and the 'National Assembly' of south Korea into a unique all-Korea legislative body;

"2. The thus formed all-Korea legislative body

shall establish a Constitution and form a government;

“3. To hold general elections to the all-Korea legislative body in future on the basis of the adopted Constitution;

...

“7. To fully carry out all the measures related to the peaceful reunification of the country until August 15 of the current year, the fifth anniversary of liberation;

“8. If the ‘National Assembly’ of south Korea consents to hold negotiations, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK is ready to send its delegation to Seoul on June 21, 1950, or receive the delegation of the ‘National Assembly’ of south Korea for conduct of negotiations. The ‘National Assembly’ of south Korea should guarantee the inviolability and security of the deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK. The Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK will in turn guarantee the inviolability and security of the deputies to the ‘National Assembly’ of south Korea.” (*Korean Central Yearbook*, 1951, p. 80. Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK “On Promoting the Peaceful Reunification of the Country”.)

In order to cause war hysteria, it was daily reported in south Korea that the south Korean army should beat back attacks on frontier posts and defend the populated areas located near the 38th parallel. It was asserted that the “threat from the north” grew as the DPRK strengthened alliance with the Soviet Union.

The official reports from Seoul asserted that not all Soviet troops were withdrawn from the DPRK and that more combat equipment and military specialists of the Soviet Union had arrived in north Korea. It was stressed that these servicemen did not wear Soviet military uniform.

The Soviet military specialists were sent to Korea in accordance with an agreement between the Korean and Soviet governments. Concerning this, General I. Seliwanov said:

“In mid-May 1950 I was called to Moscow from Woronezh, where I performed the duty of deputy chief of the military medical department of the Woronezh military district. I was given the order to leave for Pyongyang with my family. I learned that many other officers—artillerymen, tankmen, airmen, engineers—were being sent there.

“Other Soviet army doctors besides me arrived in Pyongyang: Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Podolnyak, Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Gerasimov, Lieutenant Colonel Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel Seregin and others whose names I have forgotten over time. All were worried about preparations for repulse of a possible attack by Syngman Rhee’s army.

“Comrade Kim Il Sung gave the impression of a strong-willed, authoritative leader. He talked with us in fluent Russian and was frank with us, so it was easy for us to work with him.

“With General Ri Tong Hwa we discussed the measures for medical support of the army. Medicines and medical equipment arrived from the Soviet Union. All these had to be supplied to the

combined units and units of the Korean People's Army.

"New field hospitals were deployed. I had not been in the forward units near the 38th parallel, but I knew that sporadic military actions were occurring now in one place, now in another place. Wounded Korean soldiers and officers were brought to hospital. I did not hear anyone speak about a concrete date of the beginning of war. War could break out at any moment." (Interview with General I. W. Selivanov, Moscow, July 1992.)

The Soviet Union gave military-technical assistance to the friendly DPRK. There was nothing unnatural or illegal in that. Such was the concrete fact. However, Seoul was making up exaggerated lies about it. It must have considered that a campaign for ideological brainwashing of the population of south Korea and men of the "ROK" army in combination with strategic disinformation about the enemy would bring the desired result. Many south Koreans knew nothing about the character of the military and political events taking place. In the ruling circles of Seoul and Washington the opinion was formed that south Korea was ready for the "northward march."

Balance of Confrontation Forces

Before answering the question "How did the Korean war break out?" half a century since the event took place, it is necessary to compare the armed forces on the Korean peninsula in June

1950. This proceeds from the necessity of objective study of the conditions of an outbreak of local war in the Far East soon after the end of World War II.

What was the balance of forces when the Korean war began?

Syngman Rhee's south Korean "government", supported by the United States, was the supposed enemy of the DPRK in 1950.

In the summer of 1950 the north Korean government had comprehensive information about south Korea.

North Korea had considerable superiority over south Korea in aviation. According to the data of Western intelligence, the Soviet Union supplied to north Korea (in the summer of 1950) light bombers "for direct support of the ground forces". (Earlier the Soviet Union had handed over to north Korea 83 planes: 45 YAK planes, 30 IL-10 and 8 reconnaissance planes.) In April, 13 YAK planes and 40 IL-10 planes landed in the DPRK.

All these planes were of old types. No jet plane was supplied to north Korea (Mao Zedong received Soviet jet planes in the spring of 1950). The Soviet assault plane, IL-10, was the most powerful, but it could be used successfully only against the south Korean infantry. If the US air force had joined the war on the side of south Korea, north Korea's advantage would have been reduced to zero.

How did north and south compare in manpower?

According to the data of US intelligence, in the summer of 1950 the north formed five divisions

with a total strength of 55,000 men (Pyongyang is said to have planned to have 13 divisions by September).

The latest data before the beginning of the war were as follows:

The combat units of the DPRK had over 74,000 men and officers; south Korea had over 95,000 men and officers; paramilitary organizations of the north, 1.3 million men, those of the south, 1.5 million men.

The operational formation of the north Korean army in mid-June 1950 showed that Pyongyang did not intend to take offensive action. Of the total military strength of 79,700 men only 29,900 men were deployed along the 38th parallel. In contrast, two thirds of the "ROK" army were deployed along the 38th parallel or near it, including over 32,000 men concentrated along the 38th parallel and 35,000 men stationed 50 kilometres from the 38th parallel. Only one third of the entire "ROK" army was far from the 38th parallel. Most of those were mobilized for the struggle against guerrillas.

In analysing the balance of forces, it is important to consider not only the number of divisions of one and the other side (by full complement), but also the real strength of divisions at the beginning of the war. The analysis of the US war historian Appleman led him to a paradoxical conclusion: According to his calculation, in the summer of 1950 the DPRK had eight divisions with full complement and two divisions with half complement. Only one third of this strength had combat experience. Yet 13,000 men and officers of the frontier guards of

the DPRK were deployed along the 38th parallel. About 3,000 soldiers of the internal army were stationed in Pyongyang and 5,000 men along the DPRK-PRC and DPRK-USSR frontiers.

The complement of the north Korean divisions was 11,000 men. The total of men in divisions with full complement must have been 88,000. If the strength of two divisions with incomplete complement is added to this, the total strength of the ground forces of the DPRK constituted about 99,000 men (south Korea, 114,000 men).

Of course, the figures of the American researchers may not be entirely accurate, but when the forces confronting each other on the Korean peninsula were calculated, the balance of forces was approximately equal, with a small numerical superiority of south Korea. However, the north Koreans had more soldiers who had acquired combat experience in the course of war in China. Could Pyongyang decide to provoke a war against south Korea with such a deployment of armed forces on the Korean peninsula? Hardly. How could Seoul act? Seoul studied the comparison of forces and tried to ascertain when and where Pyongyang could start an offensive, but the available data on the balance of armed forces afforded no grounds to suppose that the north would start first.

As is known, towards the end of 1948 the United States concluded a treaty on military and political cooperation with south Korea.

According to this treaty:

1. The Americans receive the right to unimped-

ed deployment of their armed forces on all the territory of south Korea, with the use of its equipment as a military bridgehead.

2. Jeju Island is placed under the authority of the US armed forces.

3. The US troops would remain in south Korea for a term of 15 years, their strength fixed at 3,000 men; evacuation of the rest was planned to be completed by October 15, 1949.

4. In wartime the US commander should command all military operations.

The Americans energetically pushed ahead with deployment and reorganization of the south Korean army, arming and training it and promised that the US air and naval forces would support south Korea in case of emergency. Roberts boasted that, except for the US army, "the south Korean army is the strongest one in Asia." In the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff MacArthur declared, "In training and war preparation the south Korean army has reached such a level that the US army can be withdrawn from south Korea."

After the withdrawal of the 6th, 40th and 7th Divisions of the 24th Army from south Korea the 8th Army, deployed in Japan, became the core of the US Far Eastern army. The 8th Army played a leading role in the Korean war. It had 83,000 men, 1,081 guns and mortars and 495 tanks.

The US air force in the Far East had 1,172 planes and the US naval force had 26 warships and 200 auxiliary ships of different classes. The unified command of the US ground and naval forces in the Far East was set up.

The US troops in the Far East were ostensibly to "defend the security of Japan" from the "threat of the Soviet Union," but actually they were used to implement Truman's doctrine on the Asian continent. When the Korean war began, all these armed forces fought on the side of south Korea (reinforcements 10,000-15,000 strong arrived from the United States every month). Therefore, in making a comparison between the armed forces of the north and those of the south it is necessary to take the US troops in the Far East into account. Recalling the first period of the war, Truman said, "It is difficult to say to what extent we surpassed the enemy, but the advantage, nevertheless, was on our side." He was comparing the military power of the US Far Eastern army with the armed forces of the Soviet Union and north Korea taken together.

Thus it is evident which side had numerical and military technical superiority on the eve of the Korean war. As some commentators assert, the obvious military superiority of the US army enabled Syngman Rhee to attack the north and Truman to undertake all-round armed intervention.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, a large-scale battle started all along the 38th parallel of Korea. Units of the Korean People's Army frustrated the attack launched by the south Korean troops on the main front areas and their appalling blows on the enemy in the direction of Seoul. They advanced southward, breaking through the enemy's defensive line. By September they had liberated almost the whole territory of south Korea, except for a not large area known as the

“bridgehead of Pusan.”

In the middle of September 1950 US armed forces landed at Inchon and temporarily held a strategic initiative, so towards late October KPA units had to retreat north, fighting battles against the enemy.

During autumn and winter operations of 1950 allied Korean-Chinese forces carried out a series of offensive operations with success. In January 1951 Seoul was liberated again, but later the UN Forces repelled the allied Korean-Chinese forces up to the 38th parallel. The front was fixed. In July 1953 an armistice agreement was concluded.

Section Four

Thundery June

The First Shot

No one officially declared the Korean war.

For this reason there are different opinions about the circumstances of the outbreak of the Korean war. Today those are briefly classified into four categories.

First, some say that south Korea ignited the war. This view was produced on June 25, 1950. The Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the DPRK announced the first official report that early on the morning of June 25, 1950, the south Korean side

had launched a surprise attack on north Korean regions and that to cope with it the government of the Republic had resolutely demanded that the south side stop its war action at once, warning that if it refuses the demand, it will then bear full responsibility for all future consequences.

A second report of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs said that the security forces and units of the People's Army of the DPRK went over to counteroffensive from defence.

As known to the world, on June 23, 1950, the south Korean army units started a large-scale artillery bombardment of the military positions of the north Korean army. According to Lieutenant General Hwang Song Bok, Chief-of-Staff of the security forces of the DPRK, the bombardment of the area north of the 38th parallel greatly destroyed the produce of the creative labour of the north Korean people. The gunfire was unprecedentedly intensive and protracted. As soon as the gunshots were over, the south Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and launched an invasion deep into the territory of the DPRK.

In the meantime "President" Syngman Rhee had close relations with Dulles through Chang Myon. On June 12 they had a contact of importance. On the special instruction of Syngman Rhee Chang Myon visited Dulles. He expressed the hope that since south Korea needed a formal guarantee of US protection, the US would include south Korea in its Far Eastern defence line.

On June 14, two days after the meeting with ambassador Chang Myon, Dulles visited Korea.

Before leaving Washington, he stated: "My visit aims at grasping the real state of affairs on the spot."

He implied the importance of his trip by adding that he was leaving for Korea "to decide US policy toward south Korea." With several officials of the Department of State he drew up a programme for his visit to Korea, including an interview with the "President" of south Korea, inspection of the area along the 38th parallel, a speech at a meeting of the "National Assembly" of south Korea and so forth.

Pyeongyang assessed Dulles's visit as US support for Syngman Rhee's plan for a "northward march". Some Washington officials shared this view.

Dulles's trip to south Korea attracted great attention in Washington and Seoul. He arrived in Seoul on June 17 and the next day inspected the front line in the company of high-ranking officials, expressing satisfaction.

Speaking at a meeting of the "National Assembly" of south Korea on June 19, he compared Korea's potentiality in the 20th century with results attained by the US in the previous century. He said that the United States had set an example to be followed by the world, and south Korea should model itself on this example in the 20th century. He concluded his speech with the following words: "You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play your part worthily in the great design for the freedom of human beings." (Glenn D. Paige, *The United States and the Korean War*, Tokyo, p. 82.)

His speech and inspection of the area along the 38th parallel were broadly reported, but there was no report about the content of the dialogue between Dulles and "President" Syngman Rhee.

According to the journalist Choe Jae Il, Syngman Rhee said: "We must put an end to Korea's partition before the Chinese communists consolidate their power. Otherwise, international communism will be able to attain superiority in the cold war." According to the testimony of Choe Tok Sin, former lieutenant general of the "ROK" army, Dulles asserted to Syngman Rhee that the United States was ready to help countries determined to fight against communism.

He said to Rhee that the 38th parallel had left a deep impression on him and that if Rhee was ready to attack communist north Korea, the US would give aid to him through the United Nations. However, he advised Rhee to fabricate the story that south Korea had been invaded first and to make up an action programme on that basis.

This programme was translated into practice. The bombardment from the enemy was concentrated on the north Korean defensive positions in the Ongjin area for six hours from 22:00 on June 23 and continued on the 24th, too.

At dawn of June 25 the south Korean troops launched intensive offensives along the whole length of the 38th parallel.

According to the reconnaissance information of Pyongyang, the Second and Fifth Divisions of the south Korean army, which had been spread out in Taejon and Kwangju to mop up the guerrillas,

moved in the direction of Kaesong, Seoul and Uijongbu and, together with the Capital Division, were deployed as operational reserves of the Eighth, Sixth, Seventh, and First Divisions and the Seventeenth Regiment in the forward area. The artillery and the units of technical services that had been under the direct control of the army were transferred to divisions in the first echelon, and all military supplies and equipment were concentrated on Seoul and the Uijongbu line.

MacArthur testified at hearings of the joint meeting of the both the Senate and House of Representatives in April 1951 that the "ROK" army had concentrated all its supplies and equipment on the area along the 38th parallel, its units had not made defensive dispositions in depth, and thus the whole region between the "38th parallel and Seoul had been turned into a logistical area." (*The Records of MacArthur Hearings*, pp. 230-231.)

On May 19, a month before the outbreak of the war, Johnson, chief of the ECA in south Korea, had said before the US House Appropriations Committee that "100,000 men and officers of the south Korean army, armed with US weapons and trained by American officers under the guidance of the US Military Advisory Group have wound up preparations for entering a war at any moment." (*Korean Central Yearbook*, 1953, Korean Central News Agency, p. 294.)

Willoughby, director of information at MacArthur's command, confessed that "a few weeks before the outbreak of war most of Syngman Rhee's troops had virtually already been deployed along the 38th parallel."

Lieutenant General Jang Chol, director of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the KPA, testified that early in May 1950 certain information that preparations for a northward invasion by the south Korean army had been made was obtained.

According to the testimony of Han Su Hwan, former political instructor of the 17th Regiment of the south Korean army, with June 25 drawing nearer, the officers of the army headquarters of the "ROK" army "visited the front line frequently", and M. Stragy and seven other US military advisors were out to build up a war system, controlling the 17th Regiment. To stiffen the soldiers' morale, they extolled the "ROK" army, equipped with the newest weapons, as a "world first-rate army." They even blustered: "You must not only capture north Korea and regain the lost territory but occupy Manchuria, once a part of your territory." Han Su Hwan continued that ever since June 23, when the military supervisors' team of the UN Commission on Korea left for Seoul after inspecting the 38th parallel, the "situation of the front line grew so acute" that all men could sense "some unusual things would happen." (*Documentary Evidence for Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, pp. 90-93.)

The 24th was Saturday, but all the men, including the officers, were confined to barracks and ordered to keep themselves on stand-by alert. The next dawn they were given an offensive order.

Some war historians (including Hayashi Katsuya, Japanese military commentator—*Tr.*) admit that in fact the war started on June 23, 1950.

A false rumour was spread that on the night of

the 24th a ball was given on the occasion of the inauguration of completion of the officers' club of Army Headquarters, where the "commanders from Seoul and the foremost area near Seoul and most of the brass hats of the Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters amused themselves late into the night." It was also claimed that the "state of emergency," which had been declared on June 9, was lifted in the evening of the 24th in the area along the 38th parallel and only one third of the armed force was in the barracks, as all officers and men were granted furlough or outings.

Nevertheless, a completely different rumour was also in the air. Ri Song Ga, the former commander of the Eighth Division of the "ROK" army, deployed on the 38th parallel, said: "For the units in Seoul it seemed another matter, but for me, a front-line divisional commander, it was different. We were in a state of emergency at that time. There was a curfew order, and we had to go into battle at dawn of June 25." (*Sasanggye*, south Korea, No. 6, 1965.)

There are not a few testimonies of witnesses. War veterans in north Korea recollected that Syngman Rhee's strategy was to let his elite units deal a crushing blow from Ongjin to Haeju, an important strategic base, while detaining KPA units in the middle and eastern fronts north of the 38th parallel and that if the Syngman Rhee's troops could occupy Haeju, it would be possible for them to advance toward Pyongyang and seize the units of the People's Army in the middle front.

Seoul radio hastily reported on June 26: "Our 17th Regiment occupied Haeju City in the direction

of Ongjin and the main force of the National Defence Army advanced 20 kilometres from the 38th parallel.”

The second assertion is that the US ignited the war. This view was suggested by north Korea in June 1950 and later supported by Moscow and Beijing.

In 1951 documentary evidence was published in Pyongyang proving that the US ruling circles provoked the Korean war. This book contains lots of materials that had been kept secret in the archives of south Korea. The data would help readers understand the aggressive action of south Korea was egged on by the United States.

“Let’s start war in Korea”— this was an aim of the US government. In accordance with this a secret plan to unleash a war in Korea was mapped up and carried out. Entering 1950, the war preparations proceeded to the finishing stage. John Osborn, *Life* correspondent to south Korea, wrote that “never before in our history had we been so nearly prepared for the start of any war as we were for the start of this war.” (*Life*, July 15, 1950.)

Everything went on secretly and minutely in accordance with the Americans’ designs to veil their aggressive nature and lay the blame for war at the DPRK’s door.

The letter delivered to Syngman Rhee by Chang Myon, the south Korean ambassador in Washington, at the beginning of 1950 said that the Department of State and the Pentagon were planning a definite alteration in their policy toward the Far East area.

For this purpose President Truman appointed Dulles as a special envoy in charge of US foreign policy, who was to give help to the Secretary of State in concluding peace treaty with Japan. As a consequence one of the most active anti-communists in the United States appeared as a performer of US East Asian policy and his influence played a decisive role in effecting US policy in this region. This implied that Syngman Rhee had an influential supporter in the Truman administration.

Outbreak of a Korean war and US involvement in it helped avert the US public's eye from the economic depression that had gripped American industry. It is on no account accidental that acceleration of war preparation coincided with the start of the US economic crisis.

An American scholar, Hershel D. Meyer, referring to the motive of the US ruling circles in starting the Korean war, wrote: "The complicated question of how to ward off the imminent collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime and various other factors increased the whim of Wall Street to open actual war in the summer of 1950. The first factor compelled it to stick to the special area called Korea and other factors, representing aspects of the general crisis of capitalism, steered it to an ordinary war."

The cheers given by the US plutocrats when the US actually started the Korean war afforded a glimpse of the war's backstage. US military expenditures swelled by 15.5 billion dollars in the first month of the outbreak of the Korean war, by 10.5 billion dollars in July and 16.8 billion dollars in

December. Orders placed by the US government for war supplies amounted to 5 billion dollars on a monthly average. The whole sum of these dollars went into the pockets of a few monopoly capitalists.

Profits earned by the seven big industries closely related to arms production showed a sharp rise, shooting up 88 percent in the engineering industry and 61 percent in oil products in the third quarter of 1950 as against the corresponding period of the previous year.

In January 1952 General Van Fleet said: "Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea here or somewhere else in the world." This statement was a naked revelation of the policy of aggression and war pursued by the US government. It was an answer to the question of what drove the US to ignite war in 1950. That is why the US fostered the south Korean army, equipped it and induced it to a "northward march."

Syngman Rhee needed war. G. Henderson, secretary of the American embassy in Seoul, remembered: "On August 25th, 1949 I had dinner with the following officers of the Korean Army: Col. Kim Paek Il, Commandant of the School of Arms; Col. Min Ki Sik, Assistant Commandant of the School, who recently returned from the Infantry School, Fort Benning; Col. Song Yo Chan, Commander in Chejoo last year and now Commandant of Cadets at the School of Arms, and Lt. Col. Chung Chong Keum, Assistant G-3, KA Headquarters.

"Col. Kim laid some emphasis on the great sentiment existing in the Army for invasion of the

North. He stated that the morale of the troops, especially of new troops, was generally very high, but that this morale was based on the feeling that they were coming into the Army to get the job of unification done. The morale of those troops which had gone to the parallel with this feeling and had remained month after month digging foxholes and repelling attacks without being able to bring the attack to the enemy had fallen off badly. Col. Kim stated that he felt 'that the troops needed about six months more training before being really prepared.' The implication of what they would be prepared for seemed understood by everyone."

A miserable defeat of Syngman Rhee in the "National Assembly" election conducted on May 30, 1950, instigated him to promote a "northward march". In this election all the candidates supported by Rhee were defeated, whereas those who supported the country's reunification through the means of dialogues between the north and the south occupied an absolute majority in the new "National Assembly". To Rhee this was a serious warning that his time was passing. In June 1950 in south Korea no force supported Syngman Rhee. For his own survival and that of his entourage the "northward march" was needed.

Syngman Rhee was supported by the United States. His private American advisor Robert Oliver's reply to Syngman Rhee's letter, dated September 30, 1949, proves it.

The letter said: "Your letter of September 30, and the copy of your Sept. 30 letter to Ambassadors Chang and Jo, have been read with utmost

care, and I have come in to Washington to confer with them. There are several matters in it to which I give you my best answers:

“On the question of attacking northward, I can see the reasons for it, I think, and sympathize with the feeling that offense is the best and sometimes the only defense. However, it is very evident to us here that any such attack now, or even to talk of such an attack, is to lose American official and public support and will weaken our position among other nations. ... The strong feeling in American official and public circles is that we should continue to lean way over backward to avoid any semblance of aggression, and make sure the blame for what happens is upon Russia.... All of us here shall, of course, continue to do all we can to alter our view that south Korea must not attack the north.” (Chang Young Rim, *The Korean War, an Unanswered Question*, 1992, pp. 37-38.)

Thus Syngman Rhee could expect to conclude an official mutual defence treaty with the US and step up the plan for a “northward expedition.” At the same time he accepted Oliver’s indirect advice as agreement with his aims.

As mentioned above, in June 1950 a talk with Secretary of Defense Johnson, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley and presidential envoy Dulles was held in Tokyo. They left Washington for Tokyo on the pretext of discussing a “peace treaty with Japan” and went into an “accidental” huddle at the MacArthur’s command.

Now what was the mission of these four bigwigs and what did they discuss at the Tokyo talk on

June 21, 1950? *The New York Times* (June 21, 1950) wrote that the confidential nature of the talk showed they were discussing a very important problem rather than such everyday affairs as the conditions of barracks and the progress of training, and an *AP* report from Tokyo (June 19, 1950) said that the loss of Taiwan would gravely threaten the US defence line. *The New York Times* of June 20 reported bluntly that General MacArthur, too, seemed fully to share the view on the impossibility of setting the Japanese question apart from the Korean and Taiwan questions. It added that accordingly, they must have discussed the Korean or Taiwan question. Meanwhile, Johnson, back in Washington from Tokyo, said in a June 24 statement that he had inspected every important unit in the Far East and grasped the real state of affairs. (*The Washington Post*, June 25, 1950.) The above news reports and Johnson's statement indicate that the main subject of the Tokyo talk was not the question of a "peace treaty with Japan," as alleged by Truman, but military affairs concerning war.

The participants in the talk must have come to a definite decision on all military, political and diplomatic questions to offer all-out support to Syngman Rhee, who faced collapse, and MacArthur and Syngman Rhee must have received a certain directive to take measure for the start of war, including the reinforcement of Far Eastern troops. That was why special bombers, including up-to-date heavy bombers, were ordered to fly immediately to the Far East.

In view of the testimonies given by Kim Hyo

Sok, former “Minister of Home Affairs of the Syngman Rhee government”, and Mun Hak Bong, the then advisor to the CIC, it can be said that the mission of Dulles who visited Seoul was to examine the war preparations of Syngman Rhee and give him a directive concerning the course of action after the outbreak of war. All these events implied that a “decisive turn” in the Far Eastern policy of the United States would be brought about.

David W. Conde offered a detailed comment on the meaning of the “decisive turn in the Far Eastern policy of the United States.” He wrote to this effect: “In view of the then situation prevailing in Korea and China, the only likely decisive turn must have meant that the US policy would deliver Chiang Kai-shek instead of admitting the victory of the Chinese revolution and would give Syngman Rhee supremacy over the whole of Korea. This decisive turn implied the large-scale positive intervention of US troops.” (*Modern History of Korea*, Vol. 2, Jap. ed., p. 95.)

Dulles’s speech at the south Korean “National Assembly” was a statement confirming the US official policy toward south Korea. In fact, through Dulles’s mouth the US government egged on the south Korean rulers to a conflict with communism.

Dulles met Syngman Rhee and Sin Song Mo at the US embassy and instructed them to “attack north Korea along with the counter-propaganda that north Korea had invaded south Korea first” and hold out for only two weeks at any cost. He reaffirmed: “If you will hold out for only two weeks, the United States will complain that north Korea attacked south Korea and see to it that the United

Nations mobilize ground, naval and air forces under its name.” He continued that if the war goes as planned, the “Communists will eventually lose their domination over north Korea.” (*Documentary Evidence for the Provocation of the Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists*, Kaebyok Newspaper Company, 1951, p. 128.)

While Dulles was busy urging the “ROK” army to a “northward march” and giving Syngman Rhee detailed war instructions, a military parade of the US 8th Army was held in the square in front of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. This was a challenge to and military pressure on the Korean people in their efforts for peaceful reunification of the country.

The aim of Dulles’s visit to Seoul and his mission were exposed to the full in his farewell messages to Syngman Rhee and Foreign Minister Rim Pyong Jik. On June 20 he wrote to Syngman Rhee: “I attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfolding.” (*Who Began the Korean War ?*, Jap. ed., Ketsuyo Bookstore, 1952, p. 41.) To Rim Pyong Jik he expressed the “hope for mutual help between the two countries” and concluded the letter with the meaningful words: “Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.”

As laid bare by US correspondent I. F. Stone, this (the “decisive role” that south Korea could play and the positive action of the United States—*Tr.*) was the “outbreak of the Korean war on June 25 and the June 27 commitment of the US govern-

ment to large-scale intervention against communism in the Pacific area.” (*The Hidden History of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, Jap. ed., Shinhyoronsha, 1953, p. 37.)

The third assertion is that north Korea ignited the war. This view was spread after June 25, 1950 (American time—*Tr.*), when the world learned that the UN Security Council had adopted a US resolution on the “armed invasion by north Korea.”

It was advocated by the other side in the war. According to it, around 4:00 a. m. on June 25, 1950 the north Korean army launched an all-out attack on south Korea. However, since there had been armed clashes between the north and the south on several occasions during the past two years, the south Korean side could not discern if it was an usually momentous offensive or a “real war.” Only when at 8:00 a. m. the attack of the north Korean side extended along the whole area of the 38th parallel did it become evident that it was a real war. A few hours later (9:26 p. m., June 24, US Eastern Standard Time) Muccio, the American ambassador in Seoul, sent this message to Washington:

“According to south Korean army reports, which are partly confirmed by field advisors of the US Military Advisory Group, north Korean forces invaded south Korean territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated at 4:00 a. m. when Ongjin was blasted by north Korean artillery fire. About 6:00 a. m. north Korean infantry commenced crossing the 38th parallel in the Ongjin area, Kaesong area and Chunchon area and an amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was reportedly

captured at 9:00 a. m., with some ten north Korean tanks participating in the operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, are reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of fighting in Kangrung are unclear, although it seems north Korean forces have cut the highway. US MAG members and south Korean officials are confirming the situation. It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against south Korea. Muccio.” (Glenn D. Paige, *The United States and the Korean War*.)

As seen above, Muccio’s report has some questionable points. First, it was based on indirect and “partly confirmed information”. Second, the information the field advisors of the US MAG received came from officials of the Defence Ministry of south Korea (South Korean officials were usually double-faced.) Third, since the US MAG field advisors were in a position to obtain military information only through south Korean army channels, they could not directly confirm the data received from the south Korean side. Fourth, Muccio added that the information was being reconfirmed, claiming that north Korea attacked south Korea first. It is evident that Muccio’s message was prearranged information.

Nevertheless, Washington insisted that the “unconfirmed” message was completely credible. Wired by Seoul, Undersecretary of State in charge of Far Eastern affairs Rusk immediately called a few of his colleagues to his side, even deferring his mealtime.

However, the information about the emergency

in Korea was not immediately reported to President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson. Acheson was at his home in Maryland, so it was several hours after the outbreak of war that he was informed of it. Truman was spending the weekend at his home in Missouri and regarded it unnecessary to return to Washington at once.

Later the United States said that the crisis in Korea was quite unforeseen, but we can see that that does not agree with the actual situation in view of its initial response to Muccio's telegram.

In addition, it was revealed that no one witnessed the start of war. One of the field advisors of the US MAG who belonged to the 12th Regiment of the First Division of the "ROK" army was near the front, but it is said that he was sleeping in Kaesong and awoke at the boom of gunfire at about 5:00 a. m.

With the passage of time "new arguments" have arisen concerning the start of war in south Korea. One is that if the Korean People's Army had not completed preparations for forestalling attack, how could it go over to an immediate offensive? A report released by the south Korean side said that a scout team of the "ROK" army saw the main forces of the KPA deploying near the 38th parallel on the eve of the war, but could not report it to their unit in time because their wireless apparatus was out of order owing to heavy rain.

Now that the south had expedited the "northward march" while declaring an "emergency," the north did not sit down with folded arms, but stated

openly that if the south takes an offensive, the north will confront it.

The last opinion is that the leading personnel of the USSR were to blame for the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula. This view became a matter of world concern after an armistice agreement was concluded at Phanmunjom. The West (the US) began to clamour noisily that according to a directive from Stalin north Korea launched military action.

Analysing the documents published in those days, one can fully understand the USSR's stance toward the Korean issue. A statement dated July 4, 1950, by Foreign Vice-Minister Gromyko relating to the US armed intervention in Korea said: "As the North American people in the '60s of the previous century united the north and the south into one national state, so the Korean people have a right to solve their national question on their own in reuniting the north and the south into a single national state." (*Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1991, p. 80.)

In recent years the mass media of different countries have said some documentary data hint at other opinions about the start of the Korean war. One is that Beijing was greatly interested in a war on the Korean peninsula, since it was preparing for an operation to liberate Taiwan from the Chinese Nationalist Party in the spring of 1950.

The Russian investigators do not yet have enough historical documentary data to accept or reject this view. Strictly speaking, it is not so important.

What is important is that the first gun report, the

first presage of war, echoed along the 38th parallel in June 1950.

That first gunshot was sounded by the south Korean army several days before the military action around the 38th parallel assumed a large-scale character. June 25, 1950, can conditionally be said to be the day of the start of the Korean war.

War matured before long. Only the first gunshot was needed.

The First Days of War

The news of the start of the Korean war was a quite unforeseen event for the majority of USSR people, in particular for specialists in Far Eastern affairs.

Russian newspapers carried articles about China and north Korea, "grave warnings" from Beijing concerning "US aggressive actions" and messages about "new provocations" of the south Korean troops, dispatched by Pyongyang.

Although the world smelled gunpowder in the summer of 1950, it was not until June 25 that anyone knew the date and place of large-scale military action on the Korean peninsula.

The USSR announced its stance after the statement of the US government, dated June 27, 1950, was published. The gist of the USSR statement was as follows:

1. According to reliable data of the USSR government, the events occurring in Korea were caused by offensives of the south Korean army on

the border line area of north Korea. The blame for these incidents is on the south Korean authorities and manipulators behind them.

2. The USSR government withdrew its troops from Korea prior to the US and thus demonstrated its principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Today, too, it maintains the principle of not tolerating interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

3. The assertion that the USSR government refused to attend the UN Security Council meeting is not correct. The USSR government was not able to participate in it owing to the manoeuvres of the US government. The failure of China, which is a member nation of the Security Council, to attend the meeting made it impossible to adopt resolutions of lawful validity. (*Relationship between the USSR and the People's Korea, 1945-1980, Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 73-74.)

Foreign Vice-Minister Gromyko also announced this statement on July 5, 1950. Such was Moscow's stand.

What was the response of Tokyo to the war report?

MacArthur received a telephone communication about the start of military action from Seoul and called his high-ranking officials to an emergency meeting. The headquarters of the US Army Forces in the Far East was regarded as the UN Command after the outbreak of war on June 25 by directive of the US government, and MacArthur was ordered to act as commander of the UN Forces.

On June 29 Truman withdrew his June 26 order

restricting the operational zone of the US naval and air forces to the area south of the 38th parallel and decided to give MacArthur the right to expand the operations of the air and naval forces to areas of north Korea. This decision was immediately sent to MacArthur, but the June 29 order concerning the dispatch on a limited scale of ground forces to Korea (the Pusan area and landing place) was withdrawn on June 30 at the request of MacArthur, and Truman invested MacArthur with full powers to use the armed forces (the US Army Forces in the Far East—*Editor.*) under his command. This order was issued at 1:22 p. m. and Dean, Commander of the 24th Division of the US 8th Army, was ordered to Korea at 8:45 p. m. and rushed Smith's battalion to the Korean front by C-54 transports. (Glenn D. Paige, *The United States and the Korean War*, p. 264.)

However, seven and a half hours earlier, before the adoption of the June 29 resolution of the National Security Council, MacArthur, on an airplane flying to Suwon, had ordered Partridge, Commander of the 5th Air Force, to "attack north Korea at once," without asking his government. He set up an advance command post in Suwon and stationed there even the 507th automatic antiaircraft unit. Around that time another ground unit was brought near Pusan to secure "harbors, air bases and landing spots."

The White House issued a carefully knit report revealing that on June 30, 1950, in compliance with the "request" of the UN Security Council, the President had "instructed the US air force to bomb all apparent military targets in north Korea in case of operational necessity and to blockade the whole

coast of the Korean peninsula”; he had also “authorized General MacArthur to use a certain support ground army unit.” (*Ibid.*, p. 260.)

According to these official reports, the bombing of north Korea was to be allowed only for military targets confirmed in an operational view; the troops to be dispatched to Korea were limited to certain “support ground army units” and could join only in support operation. However, the order issued to MacArthur gave him full powers to use without limit all the armed ground, naval and air forces under the headquarters of the US Army Forces in the Far East. And in compliance with the merciless order to “erase all the north Korean cities off the map!” the bombing of north Korea was carried out indiscriminately, regardless of military targets or peaceful facilities, without the limitation of operational necessity.

As seen above, MacArthur, authorized by Truman to throw onto the Korean front all the ground units under the headquarters of the US Army Forces in the Far East, placed under his command all the ground, naval and air forces in the Pacific, including the 7th Fleet and the 5th Air Force. Afterwards he exercised his authority as “Commander of the UN Forces” on the strength of the “July 7 resolution” of the UN Security Council on the setting up of the “UN Command” led by the United States. On July 15 he held concurrently the post of commander-in-chief of the ground, naval and air forces of south Korea at the “written request” of Syngman Rhee. Behaving like a “sovereign of the Far East,” MacArthur attempted to occupy Korea at a stroke.

MacArthur hurled to the Korean front such renowned generals as US 8th Army Commander Walker, Dean, Keiser, and Gay and all the divisions that had demonstrated their “invincibility” in many wars.

In the meantime the north Korean armed forces overcame successfully the resistance of south Korean troops, which had gone over to defence, and already on June 25 held complete strategic initiative. Some conditions for a combined tank unit of the KPA to engage in the battle in the direction of Seoul were created. Under the support of the air force T-34 tanks launched an advance toward Seoul.

On the evening of June 27 mechanized infantry units and tanks advanced to the Seoul suburbs. The KPA soldiers did not fire guns to protect the lives of peaceful inhabitants and cultural and historical monuments. Fierce street fighting took place. On the morning of June 28 Seoul was under the complete control of the KPA.

The flag of the DPRK was hoisted on the capitol building. Over 8, 000 patriots who had been in prison were released. The Seoul citizens enthusiastically welcomed the KPA soldiers, who helped them recover their liberty.

At Seoul the main force of the “ROK” army was annihilated.

The UN’s Stance

As mentioned above, in the daytime of June 25,

1950, Muccio, the American ambassador in Seoul, cabled the message on the situation along the 38th parallel to Washington. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for the UN affairs, asked the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, to call a UN Security Council meeting at once.

On June 25 an emergency meeting of the Security Council was held. The Soviet representative was absent. The grounds for the meeting and debate were Muccio's report of June 25 and the belated report of the same day sent by the UN Commission on Korea.

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, regarding the report, which was based on "unconfirmed" data, as the only "legal ground," called the meeting in spite of the opposition of some countries. The meeting was not to argue over the responsibility for the outbreak of war but, from the first, to give "north Korea the verdict of guilty."

At the meeting the US representative, Gross, submitted a "draft resolution" defining the DPRK as the "aggressor." The draft resolution was an enlarged version of the "gist of the draft resolution" that had been ratified by officials of the US Department of State before the war. After a debate the phrase "the armed aggression of north Korea" in the US draft resolution was replaced by "the armed attack on south Korea." A resolution was rushed through, demanding the "withdrawal of the north Korean army back to the 38th parallel," while urging both parties to "stop the act of war."

The "resolution" of June 25 of the UN Security Council was adopted without the presence of the

representative of the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the council, having veto power.

John Frat, chief of the Far Eastern Section of the British Intelligence Bureau, pointed out that on June 25 the UN Security Council acted completely at the discretion of the United States, losing impartiality and objectivity. Condemning this, he cited the following instance: "The verdict of 'guilty' given to north Korea was based on the telegram sent by the UN Commission on Korea, which told that there was no evidence as to which side had launched first attack. The text of the telegram from Seoul was withheld. In other words, the texts of Muccio's report and the report of the UN Commission on Korea were not read in the meeting, and the meeting was called and a 'resolution' was thus railroaded through on the basis of the forged document of the US government, in which the faked fact about 'north Korea's declaration of war' was inserted."

Airing his opposition to the propaganda of his government, which defined north Korea as the aggressor, even US journalist Stone, the author of the *Hidden History of the Korean War*, cited the following facts:

First, as was pointed out in the July 30 report of the MacArthur's command on the battle situation, the "north Korean army could not complete its mobilization programme (13-15 divisions) by June 25, when the war started, and had only six divisions completely prepared for action."

Second, the Soviet Union was unable to exercise a veto because it was absent from the Security Council meeting. It is hard to believe that north

Korea could open fire first before completing war preparations, and it is also hard to think that it started war first when a veto could not be placed on the US proposal. And, when Syngman Rhee was faced with ruin as a result of the north Korea's peace offensive and the failure of the May 30 "election", there could be no need to strike at a "government which might be replaced with a new government ready to enter immediately into negotiations for reunification."

The June 25 resolution itself, however, was still short of giving legality to the US scheme for all-out armed intervention. That was why Gross, in his radio interview held at Lake Success, spoke vehemently that if north Korea did not accept their resolution, "the means the Security Council can take ... included economic means, the use of military force or the possibility of taking other kinds of sanctions." His words hinted at what measure the United States was going to take next.

Around 8:00 p. m. on June 25 the Secretary of State, Undersecretaries of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held the first secret meeting at the order of Truman, where they deliberated over the "rational ways" of the US army's intervention. The Acheson's memorandum, passed without amendment, contained the following points: 1) To authorize MacArthur to ship to south Korea military equipment in addition to what was provided in the "US-south Korea mutual defense and aid pact"; 2) To use the air force in the name of evacuation of

Americans, and this air force is authorized to destroy the airplanes and tanks of the People's Army that "hinder the rescue of Americans"; 3) To dispatch the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent the liberation of Taiwan; 4) To take into consideration what "aid" should be given to south Korea on the basis of the June 25 "resolution" and subsequent "resolution" of the Security Council of the United Nations.

On the evening of the 25th, before the adoption of the June 27 Security Council resolution on the UN member states' "aid" to south Korea, Truman declared that all the "aid" the United States would offer south Korea would be under the UN flag and instructed the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to "prepare the necessary orders in advance," so that the US armed forces could all be mobilized in the name of the UN.

On June 26 an official decision on all-out armed intervention of the US forces in north Korea was adopted and an order was ratified in Washington to bomb towns and villages of north Korea.

That night Truman convened a second meeting. Having received from MacArthur a report on the situation, saying that "the south Korean army is unable to resist north Korea's attack" and a "complete defeat is close at hand," he said that "south Korea must be rescued at once before it is trampled down," approved "without substantial amendment" Acheson's five-point proposal on the mobilization of US naval and air forces to the Korean front, and ordered that the resolution of the

meeting be made known to MacArthur for immediate execution. At noon on June 27 Truman officially announced the news to the world through a presidential statement.

In actuality, all-out armed intervention by US forces had already started and the operational zones of the air and naval forces covered the whole land of Korea from the outset. B-29 bombers sent by MacArthur appeared over Korea in the daytime of June 26 and were bombing, and the 7th Fleet moved to the Taiwan Strait that day.

These facts clearly show that the dispatch of ground forces had been decided previously. According to a report of *The Washington Post*, at 3:00 a. m. on June 27 (American time, that is, five hours after the second meeting) the chief of the army intelligence bureau of south Korea made a radio address in Korean to the following effect:

“At 4:00 p. m. June 27 (Korean time) I was informed by the MacArthur’s command that a field command post of the headquarters would be set up in Seoul immediately. The next morning the US air force will sally directly and the ground forces, too, will gradually go into action.”

This report was repeated several times at intervals of ten minutes, accompanied by marches. It was a special programme arranged by the US government on the recommendation of MacArthur, aimed at rousing the fighting morale of the distressed south Korean army by informing it alone, in advance, of the United States’ general plan. As Truman had instructed to ban the announcement of

all statements before he made an official statement on the 27th, the high-ranking policy makers of the US had agreed upon reporting their plan in Korean, not in English.

In his June 27 statement Truman ordered the US 7th Fleet "to check the Chinese communist army's attack on Taiwan" and instructed that the military aid of the United States to the Philippine government and the French troops fighting against the Vietnamese Democratic Republic be increased.

In this way the US government started its armed intervention in Korea while launching direct aggression against the Chinese People's Republic. It also strengthened its interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines and promoted a predatory war against the Vietnamese people.

The British government, led by the Labour Party, also joined the Korean war. On June 28, 1950, Prime Minister Attlee stated at a Lower House meeting that the British government had placed its fleet, which was in Far Eastern territorial waters, under the control of MacArthur, so as to draw it into the Korean war. Before long British infantry troops were dispatched to the southern part of Japan.

The Korean war laid bare the UN's substantial role in solving a matter concerning security for the first time. The Security Council meeting held on June 27 at the request of the US government served as a "legal" occasion for "approving" post factum the decision of the secret confab on the evening of June 26 called by Truman and his statement issued at noon on the 27th.

At the meeting of the same day US representative Austin submitted a "draft resolution" urging the "United Nations to induce the member states to offer necessary aid to south Korea in order to repulse the armed attack and restore international peace and security." Despite opposition to the US proposal, a "resolution" was adopted under US pressure at 11: 45 p. m. that day, allowing armed intervention in Korea by the UN member states. This happened twelve hours after the issue of Truman's June 27 statement officially announcing US armed intervention in north Korea. In this way the United States embellished its unquestionable armed intervention with the name of the United Nations, and the United Nations, in contravention of its Charter, played a dishonourable role in "justifying" the United States' high-handed interference in the internal affairs of another country.

Later the US ruling circles themselves admitted that the United States started military intervention before it got the "approval" of the United Nations. At the MacArthur Hearing in May 1951 Senator Harry Berd questioned Bradley, who gave the following testimony:

Bradley: On June 26 an order sanctioning the use of US naval and air forces against the north Korean army in the area south of the 38th parallel reached MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Berd: You mean our army actually intervened before the UN approval?

Bradley: To help the evacuation of Americans, the air force and navy started intervening on the previous day.

Berd: But the "order on the use of the US naval and air forces against the north Korean army in the area south of the 38th parallel" says nothing of the evacuation of Americans. Does this mean that the naval and air forces went into war at once?

Bradley: Yes, it does.

Berd: And did they do that 12 hours before it was approved at the United Nations?

Bradley: Because we deemed it necessary to back the evacuation of our nationals.

Berd: Meanwhile, it contradicts your yesterday's statement that our army went to Korea according to the UN resolution. The point, therefore, is that the fighting was actually going on with the north Korean army one day before the adoption of the UN resolution.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council ratified the US government's "draft resolution" on the establishment of the "UN Command" under the US command.

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie distributed the "resolution" to all member states. Later about 20 member states declared that they were ready to execute it. In particular, Australia, Britain, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa dispatched troops under the control of the UN Command of the Army Forces in the Far East; India, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Italy sent ambulances or field ambulances or medical corps.

What, then, was the USSR's posture? The UN representative of the USSR was absent at the

Security Council meeting held on June 27, 1950, to discuss the Korean situation. The USSR, which is an influential permanent member state of the Security Council, was bound to carry out the demand of the UN Charter. The UN Charter indicates that the Security Council should take necessary measures to support and restore international peace and security. On June 27, 1950, the US government requested that USSR leading personnel exercise influence upon the north Korean authorities, but they answered that they would maintain their traditional principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

The US government started its aggression against Korea before the convocation of the Security Council meeting on June 27, independent of whatever resolution the Security Council might adopt.

In this way the US government had the UN sanction post factum the crime it had already committed; the Security Council conferred legal validity on the resolution suggested by the US government the previous day.

The adoption of the US resolution in the Security Council was a high-handed violation of the UN Charter. Article 27 of the UN Charter stipulates that "decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members" (then the USSR, China, the United States, Britain and France).

However, the United States' resolution approving its invasion of Korea was adopted by an affir-

mative vote of the United States, Britain, France, Norway, Cuba and Ecuador—six countries in all. The vote of the representative of the Nationalist Party of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek, which illegally occupied the place of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council, was regarded as the seventh affirmative vote on this resolution.

Moreover, of five permanent member states of the Council only three, that is, the United States, Britain and France, were present at the Security Council meeting on June 27 and the representatives of the USSR and China were absent. Due to the United States' hostile stance toward the Chinese people, China lost the possibility to let its legal representative take part in the Security Council meeting. This conditioned the USSR not to attend the council meeting.

As seen above, the Security Council meeting held on June 27 ignored the two principles to be observed in adopting resolutions. Accordingly, the resolutions it adopted could have no legal validity.

Conclusion

World War II left a heavy legacy of partition of countries. Of these, Korea may be called a "record holder" in view of the long period and acuteness of its partition.

Half a century has passed since Korea's libera-

tion from Japanese colonial rule. For the same period it has been divided and thus the Korean people have suffered a national tragedy unprecedented in their 5,000-year history.

During the past 20 years a few countries, that is, Viet Nam, Germany and Yemen, put an end to separation and were unified in this or that way.

Korea alone is divided into two parts as ever and presents a lot of complicated problems to herself and the world. Such circumstances are apparently contrary to the common aspiration of the north and south Korean people for great national unity and the elimination of barriers to its realization.

The ringleader of Korea's partition is the United States, and the USSR, too, is regarded as a country concerned.

Their protracted confrontation was tragically reflected in the destiny of Korea.

As shown by this book, Korea's separation went through different phases: the division of the country into two occupation zones, the establishment of two governments, war between the two sides that caused a great international dispute, postwar development and birth of different socio-economic organisms in the north and south.

Each stage hardened Korea's split. However, who can dare come to a hasty conclusion as to the eternal partition of the Korean nation and the end of its existence as an integrated entity?

If the political forces of the north and south are not ready to create favourable conditions for reunification or make strenuous efforts to pave the way

toward reunification, such a danger cannot be removed.

In connection with this President Kim Il Sung in 1991 delivered good advice:

“... the time-honoured commonness of the north and south as one nation has never changed; they are still homogeneous nationally. If there is anything different between the north and south, it is the heterogeneity which has something to do with the two systems which have existed for the past 40 odd years; it can be no big problem when compared to the national homogeneity which has been formed and consolidated for thousands of years. The difference in the two systems can never be the reason for our nation to live separated from one another; it can be no insurmountable obstacle in reunifying the north and south.” (*New Year Address*, January 1, 1991.)

Korean history since 1945 is one of partition and at the same time one of uninterrupted struggle against it.

The 1950-53 war delayed the reunification of the Korean peninsula and made it more difficult. The war clearly indicated that resorting to force is not the way to reunify the country.

Here is another important lesson of recent years: Despite an atmosphere of mutual distrust and hostility after the Korean war, there were attempts to realize contact and cooperation between the north and the south, overcoming antagonism on several occasions.

Notable examples of this were the north-south joint statement on July 4, 1972, multilateral con-

tacts in the mid-1980s, an agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation and exchange between the north and the south in 1991, and the joint statement on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

All these documents reflect the will, thirst and burning aspiration of the Korean nation for reunification, which have by no means disappeared, but are seething more vigorously.

As the facts prove, the Korean nation can solve the reunification question by its own strength.

Reality shows that to realize the country's peaceful reunification on the principle of great national unity of all the nation, there is no other way but to establish a unified national state representing all the nation's interests, leaving the two systems and the two governments as they are.

In this sense, establishing a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo is a most justifiable and rational proposal for reunification.

The aspiration of the Korean people for peaceful reunification coincides with the objective, realistic main trend of the historical development of Korea and political practice in the late 20th century.

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